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ABSTRACT
From 1787 until 1792 the issue of the apportionment of
representatives in the House of Representatives was the
focus of spirited debate in American politics.

The central

issue at stake was the size and influence of each of the
sections in future Congresses.

The representation issue was

first debated during the Constitutional Convention in 1787.
After a temporary settlement of the representation guestion
in the Convention, the First Congress re-opened the
apportionment debate.

The result was a constitutional

amendment that would have significantly increased the size
of the House of Representatives.

After that amendment

failed to pass the states, the Second Congress finally
passed in 1792 an apportionment bill that increased the
House in size in time for the convening of the Third
Congress in March 1793.
No historian that I know of has addressed the
representation debate after the Constitutional Convention.
Therefore, the details of the debate over the apportionment
amendment remained unexamined.

Additionally, the contest in

the Second House to increase the size of the House has been
virtually ignored.
This paper therefore addresses the representation
debate from 1787 to 1792.

Starting with the Constitutional
vn

Convention of 1787, I have traced the representation
question through the First Congress and the failed
apportionment amendment to the debate's conclusion in the
Second Congress.
Both primary and secondary sources were used in the
research of this paper.

Additionally, legislative roll call

analysis was used to determine the degree of sectionalism
surrounding the representation debate in the Second
Congress.
The conclusion of my research is that North-South
sectionalism played a significant role in the apportionment
debate.

The question of slavery's place in the

apportionment of representatives was central to the debate
in the Constitutional Convention.

Although the slavery

question was settled by the "three-fifths compromise," the
North and the South, after the Convention, divided along
sectional lines on the question of how large of an increase
in the size of the House of Representatives was necessary.
By the Second Congress the South had split with the North on
that issue.
emerged.

But within the North, two distinct voting blocs

The New England and the Mid-Atlantic states

fractured over the details of limiting the increase in the
number of representatives in the House.

Thus, by 1792, a

distinct North-South sectionalism over the size and make-up
of the House of Representatives was present in American
politics.

vixi

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
A quandary faced American statesmen in 1787 when they
attempted to establish the new American government.

With a

tradition of opposition to the royal government's perceived
abuses of power, the founding fathers put their hopes for
the United States' future in the separation of powers.

In

their Novus Ordo Seclorum the legislature would predominate.
But there was no acceptable precedent for apportionment of
representation among the states in the national legislature
so that the Congress neither dominated the polity nor was
subject to the majority's whims and caprices.

Thus, James

Madison's dictum that "You must first enable the government
to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to
control itself,"1 became the benchmark of a protracted and
complex debate surrounding the apportionment of
representatives in the House of Representatives.
The apportionment issue was first debated at the
meeting of the First Continental Congress.

Virginia, with

20 percent of the country's population, unsuccessfully
1Publius, The Federalist 51, from New York Independent
Journal, 6 February 1788, John P. Kaminski et al., eds.,
Commentaries on the Constitution; Public and Private, vols.
13-16 of The Documentary History of the Ratification of the
Constitution, 16 vols., ed. Merrill Jensen (Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 16:44
(hereinafter cited as Commentaries).
1

2

argued for proportional representation in the national
legislature.

In 1776 Virginia, with the assistance of

Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, again unsuccessfully
demanded that proportional representation should be the
basis for representation in the national legislature.2

When

the Continental Congress ratified the Articles of
Confederation in 1777, the debate surrounding the
apportionment of representation was temporarily settled.

In

lieu of proportional representation, each state was given an
equal vote in the national legislature.3

Not until 1789 and

the ratification of the Federal Constitution was the
apportionment of representation in the Congress
significantly altered.
Although the public debate on the apportionment of
representatives appeared negligible throughout the
Confederation period, certain key points of the later debate
did emerge.

By 1781 and the states' ratification of the

Articles of Confederation, the North and the South were
convinced that distinct social, economic, and political
differences existed between them.4

The apportionment issue

2Merrill Jensen, ed., Constitutional Documents and
Records, 1776-1787, vol. 1, The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution, 16 vols. (Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 1: 240
(hereinafter cited as Documents).
3Act of Confederation of the United States of America,
ibid., 1: 87. Article V of the Article of Confederation
guaranteed each state an equal vote in the national
legislature.
^Documents, 1: 240.
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was clearly linked to those differences, and none more
markedly than slavery.

If, for example, the apportionment

of representatives in the national legislature was to be
based on population, were slaves to count as citizens?

If

apportionment were to be based on property and tax quotas,
should slaves be counted as taxable property?

If for

taxation purposes the national government’s expenses were to
be divided among the states based on their respective
numbers in the national legislature, where did slaves fit
into the determination of each state's representation?
When the Constitutional Convention convened in May
1787, the issue of the apportionment of representatives in
the national legislature again entered American politics at
the national level.

Delegates to the Constitutional

Convention vigorously debated the apportionment of
representatives in the future Congress.

Alexander Hamilton

noted,
the small states, seeing themselves embraced by the
Confederation on equal terms, wished to retain the
advantages which they already possessed. The large
states, on the contrary, thought it improper that Rhode
Island and Delaware should enjoy an equal suffrage with
themselves. From these sources of conflict a delicate
and difficult contest arose. It became necessary,
therefore, to compromise, or the Convention would have
dissolved without effecting any thing.55
5That compromise entailed equal representation in the
Senate and proportional representation on the House of
Representatives. Alexander Hamilton to the New York
Convention, 20 June 1788, Max Farrand, ed., The Records of
the Federal Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1911-37, 4 vols.; reprint, New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1966), 4 vols., 3: 337 (page references are to
reprint edition, hereinafter cited as Farrand, Records).

4

However, the compromise reached in the Constitutional
Convention was short lived.

During the ratification contest

in the states, the apportionment issue again became the
focus of debate.

But the issues surrounding the

apportionment of representatives to the House of
Representatives had changed.

Rather than focusing on

slavery's role in apportionment calculations, which had been
effectively settled by the noted three-fifths compromise,
the debate following the Constitution's ratification
centered on the size of the increase in the House of
Representatives.

Coupled with the arguments surrounding the

costs of maintaining the Congress, the apportionment debate
increasingly divided Northerners and Southerners.
Although by 1789 nine states had ratified the
Constitution, it was clear that many individuals within
those same states found the Constitution's apportionment
clause inadeguate.

The First Congress therefore debated an

apportionment amendment to the Constitution.

The result was

an amendment that would have significantly increased the
number of representatives in future Congresses.
Additionally, the First Congress also submitted an amendment
to the states prohibiting the Congress from granting itself
a mid-term pay raise.

When the apportionment amendment

failed to pass the states in 1791, the Second Congress,
after extended debate, codified and passed an apportionment
law incorporating a representation ratio acceptable to the
majority of representatives.

5

Although the question of the apportionment of
representatives in the Congress was a central issue in
American politics from 1787 to 1792, the details and
significance of that debate have yet to be the focus of an
in-depth historical analysis.

Many questions surrounding

that debate remained unanswered.

For example, why was the

apportionment issue so vigorously contested?

What were the

public and private arguments presented during the debate?
What voting blocs and coalitions emerged throughout the
course of the debate?

Did Northerners align against

Southerners on the apportionment issue, or did the sections
fracture into coalitions of divergent interests?
Contemporaries understood the significance of the
debate surrounding the apportionment of representatives in
the Congress.

The Pennsylvania Gazette on 5 March 1788

noted that "The American seems to be duly impressed with the
propriety and duty of making the voice of the majority the
law of the land."6

An opponent of the Constitution noted

that the essential parts of free and good government "are a
full and equal representation of the people in the
legislature. . . ."7

Madison, in The Federalist 55, wrote,

The number of which the House of Representatives is to
consist forms another, and a very interesting point of
view under which this branch of the federal legislature
Pennsylvania Gazette. 5 March 1788, Commentaries, 16:
321.
^Federal Farmer, Letters to the Republican, 9 October
1787, ibid., 14: 25-26.

6

may be contemplated. Scarce any article indeed in the
whole constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of
attention, by the weight of character and the apparent
force of argument, with which it has been assailed.8
Yet, few historians have considered the apportionment
debate from 1787 to 1792.

Most historians of the

Confederation and early Federalist periods have focused on
aspects other than the apportionment issue.

But the

historical debates surrounding the social, economic, and
ideological divisions in American society are germane.

One

can discern distinct divisions in American politics on a
wide range of issues.

Perhaps the apportionment issue was

one such issue.
One school of historians has taken notice of the
divisions in American politics at the time of the convening
of the Constitutional Convention in May 1787.

Charles A.

Beard, in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of
the United States, spoke of the economic divisions within
the Convention.

Forrest McDonald, in We the People, stated

that the Convention was the product of several conflicting
interests and elements.

David Smith likewise noted the

ideological and economic cleavage in the American polity by
1789, in The Convention and the Constitution. Orin Libby,
in The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of the Thirteen
States on the Federal Constitution, 1787-8, contended that

8Publius, The Federalist 55, from New York Independent
Journal, 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 111.

7

"the areas of intercourse and wealth carried the
Constitution."9
Conversely, John P. Roche, in "The Convention as a Case
Study in Democratic Politics," wrote of the Convention
delegates' political unity.

He claimed that the

Constitutional Convention can be viewed as a nationalist
reform caucus without the presence of clear-cut ideological
divisions among the delegates.

Robert E. Brown's Charles A.

Beard and the Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" contended the
delegates to the Convention were in fact a homogeneous group
with little class conflict.10
A North-South sectionalism has been many historians'
theme when discussing the Constitutional Convention.

Lance

Banning, in The Jeffersonian Persuasion, wrote that by 1787
profound economic and social differences were present
9Charles A. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States (New York: The Macmilliam
Company, 1913), 324-25; Forrest McDonald, We the People: The
Economic Origins of the Constitution (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), 416; David G. Smith, The
Convention and the Constitution: The Political Ideals of the
Founding Fathers (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 58;
Orin G. Libby, The Geographical Distribution of the Vote of
the Thirteen States on the Federal Constitution, 1787-8
(Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1894; reprint, New York:
Burt Franklin, 1969), 49 (page references are to reprint
edition).
10John P. Roche, "The Convention as a Case Study in
Democratic Politics" in Leonard W. Levy, ed., Essays on the
Making of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1969), 179; Robert E. Brown, Charles A. Beard and the
Constitution: A Critical Analysis of "An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution" (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1956), 20-21.

8

between the democratic oriented North and the aristocratic
South and the commercial East and the agricultural West.
Andrew C. McLauglin's A Constitutional History of the United
States also noted that a distinct sectionalism between both
the East and the West and the North and the South was indeed
present in the Convention.

Charles Warren, in The Making of

the Constitution, considered the relationship between the
apportionment issue and sectionalism.

He wrote that the

struggle surrounding apportionment was between the South,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts on one side and the rest of
the Union on the other.

Staughton Lynd stated, in Class

Conflict, Slavery, and the United States Constitution, that
conflict between the North and the South preceded the
Convention.

North-South sectionalism subsequently played a

dividing role in the convention.11
Max Farrand's The Framing of the Constitution of the
United States noted different interests within the
Convention.

He stated that the major divisions surrounding

the apportionment issue were between the small states and
the large states.

Catherine Drinker Bowen, in Miracle at

Philadelphia, seconded Farrand's interpretation of the small
11Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution
of a Party Ideology (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1978), 107; Andrew C. McLaughlin, A Constitutional History
of the United States (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company,
1935), 186; Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1937), 246; Staughton
Lynd, Class Conflict, Slavery, and the United States
Constitution (New York: The Bobbs-Merril Company, 1967), 14.

9

states opposed to the large states, not the South aligned
against the North or the East against the West.12
Only one historian that I know of has directly
addressed sectionalism’s role in the specifics of the
apportionment debate during the Constitutional Convention.
Calvin Jillson, in Constitution Making, noted that the
apportionment issue was one of the clearest North-South
confrontations in the Convention.

Kenneth R. Bowling's

"Politics in the First Congress, 1789-1791" took the issue
of sectionalism one step further.

He wrote that sectional

interests dominated debates during the First Congress.13
Unfortunately, no historian has yet discussed the dual
issues of apportionment and sectionalism in the Second
Congress.
While there is paucity of secondary sources on the
debate from 1787 to 1792 over the apportionment of
representatives in the House of Representatives, it is
possible to present that debate’s public and private details
and progression.

Research utilizing both contemporary

commentaries and legislative roll call analysis indicates
12Max Farrand, The Framing of the Constitution of the
United States (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1912), 82;
Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia: The Story
of the Constitutional Convention May to September 1787
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), 186.
13Calvin C. Jillson, Constitution Making: Conflict and
Consensus in the Federal Convention (New York: Agatha Press,
1988), 94: Kenneth R. Bowling, "Politics in the First
Congress, 1789-91". (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin,
1968), 244.

10

clearly that by the end of the First Session of the Second
Congress there was a division between the North and the
South on the apportionment issue.

Additionally, the

Northern states divided between the New England states and
the Mid-Atlantic states over the apportionment issue.

Thus,

my hypotheses are that by 1792 Northerners and Southerners
had divided in the House of Representatives along sectional
lines on the issue of the apportionment of representatives
in the House of Representatives, with Northerners favoring a
limited number of representatives in the House and
Southerners favoring an increase in that body’s size.
Additionally, within the North two voting blocs emerged: a
New England bloc that stuck to the extreme Northern view and
a Mid-Atlantic bloc that occupied something of a middle
position between New England and the South.

These

hypotheses will be approached through utilization of
contemporary documents, public debates, private journals,
and legislative roll call analysis of the House of
Representatives of the Second Congress.

CHAPTER 2
THE REPRESENTATION DEBATE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
When the Constitutional Convention convened in
Philadelphia in May 1787, the debate on the apportionment of
representation in future Congresses was thrust to the fore
of American politics.

Few issues were the subject of more

debate in the Convention than the question of the states'
representation in future Congresses.

Delegates to the

Convention struggled throughout the summer with the
apportionment issue.

The North and the South’s concerns

over their influence in the new Congress and slavery's role
in apportionment complicated plans to apportion
representation.

Only after protracted debate and eventual

compromise did the Convention temporarily settle the
apportionment issue.
The apportionment debate began almost immediately with
the convening of the Constitutional Convention.

On 29 May

Edmund Randolph of Virginia submitted fifteen proposals for
consideration to the Convention.

Randolph's second

proposition dealt specifically with how to apportion
representation in the new Congress.

It read that the

rights of suffrage in the national legislature ought to
be proportional to the quotas of contribution or to the

11

12

number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule
may seem best in different cases.1
On 11 June the Committee of the Whole was prepared to
debate the details of Randolph's second proposition.

The

Convention had previously agreed on a bicameral legislature
with a House of Representatives directly elected by the
people.2

Now the delegates to the Convention had the

opportunity to elucidate their concerns over the
apportionment of representatives in that Congress.

John

Rutledge of South Carolina expressed the Southern position.
He stated that he preferred to see representation
apportioned according to the states' comparative wealth,
therefore implying that slave populations would be included
in all determinations of apportionment.

James Wilson of

Pennsylvania likewise stressed that the Southern states
deserved additional representatives to account for their
slave populations.

Benjamin Franklin, also of Pennsylvania,

lA complete copy of Randolph’s fifteen propositions,
also known as the Virginia Resolutions, can be found in
Merrill Jensen, ed., Constitutional Documents and Records,
1776-1787, vol. 1, The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution. 16 vols. (Madison: State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 1: 243
(hereinafter cited as Documents).
20n 31 May 1787 the Constitutional Convention agreed on
a House of Representatives directly elected by the people.
On 9 June the Convention voted in favor of a bicameral
legislature. Max Farrand, ed., The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 191137, 4 vols.; reprint, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1966), 4 vols., 1: 46, 176 (page references are to reprint
edition, hereinafter cited as Farrand, Records).
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argued the apportionment of representatives should be in
proportion to each states' number of inhabitants.3
As the first order of business, Rufus King of
Massachusetts submitted a resolution to amend Randolph's
second proposition.

King's resolution ruled out

apportioning representation equally among the states.
Unlike the Articles of Confederation’s fifth article,
apportionment in future Congresses would be based on
proportional representation.4

David Brearley of New Jersey,

speaking in opposition to King, noted that any provision
denying the states equal representation in the Congress
would lead to despotism.

He flippantly proposed a "new

division so that each state is equal— then a government on
the present system will be just."5

Brearley feared that if

the states were not guaranteed equal representation in the
Congress, two divergent coalitions of states would emerge:
the first consisting of Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia and the second comprised of the ten other states.
He noted that the total votes of the smaller ten states,
based on wealth and population, failed to equal the voting
power of the three most populous states combined.6

3lbid., 1: 204, 205, 197.
4ibid., 1: 192. For the one vote per state provisions
of the Articles of Confederation, see Documents, 1: 86.
5Farrand,
6 l b i d . , 1:

R e c o r d s , 1:
184.

181-82.

14

Following the passage of King's resolution, Rutledge
moved to add to it a clause that would have based
apportionment in the Congress on tax quotas.

Rutledge's

resolution came under attack from the smaller states.
William Patterson of New Jersey found the new clause
particularly onerous and asked, "Is a man, for example,
possessing a property of £4000 to have 40 votes to one
possessing

£

100?"7

Unable to reach a consensus on

Rutledge's resolution, the Committee of the Whole postponed
consideration of it to take up debate on the other major
issue of controversy surrounding apportionment--slavery.
James Wilson, seconded by C.C. Pinckney of South
Carolina, introduced an amendment to Rutledge's resolution
basing representation
in proportion to the whole number of white and other
free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex and
condition, including those bound to a servitude for a
term of years, and three-fifths of all other persons.8

7 Ibid., 1: 182
8ibid., 1: 193. Wilson based his provision on the
precedent established during debate of the Articles of
Confederation in 1783. At that time, it was agreed that all
expenses incurred for the defense and general welfare of the
United States would be defrayed from the treasury. The
treasury would be supported by the states in proportion to
the whole number of white and other free citizens, including
indentured servants, and "three-fifths of all other persons
not comprehended in the foregoing description. . . ."; see
also, Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State
Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 2nd
ed., 5 vols. (Washington: Taylor & Maury, 1866), 1: 95
(hereinafter cited as Elliot, Debates.).

15

On 18 April 1783 the Continental Congress had agreed to the
"three-fifths" compromise.

That clause had settled the

Congress's argument over slavery's role in the apportionment
of taxes.

Wilson hoped that in 1787 the three-fifths clause

would again settle a divisive issue.9
Randolph's original resolution had been significantly
altered by 13 June when Virginia's delegation to the
Convention introduced the Virginia Plan--its model of the
new government.

Resolution 7 of the Virginia Plan dealt

specifically with the House of Representatives.

It

encompassed the earlier changes to Randolph's resolution to
include a statement that representation in the new Congress
would not be based on the Articles of Confederation's model
of one vote per state.

The Virginia Plan additionally

incorporated the three-fifths clause and allowed inclusion
of the South's slave population in the apportionment of
representatives.10
The delegates from the smaller states and many
Northerners viewed the Virginia Plan with alarm.

The

provisions providing for proportional representation in the
Congress and the related three-fifths clause were seen as
attempts to establish a Southern dominated legislature.
Luther Martin of Maryland, an eventual opponent of the
Constitution, echoed Brearley's earlier statement and noted,
9Documents, 1: 86; Elliot, Debates, 1: 95.
lOFarrand,

R e c o r d s .1:

227;

D o c u m e n t s , 1: 249.
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Out of the number 90, Virginia has 16 votes,
Massachusetts 14, Pennsylvania 12— in all 42. Add to
this a state having four votes, and it gives a majority
in the general legislature. Conseguently, a combination
of these states will govern the remaining nine or ten
states.11
The delegates from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey,
and Delaware therefore formulated their own plan of
government.

William Patterson of New Jersey presented it to

the Convention on 15 June.

The New Jersey Plan, as it came

to be known, was based on the model of the Articles of
Confederation.12

it called for an equal representation

among the states in a unicameral Congress.

Although the New

Jersey Plan failed to pass the Convention, it did succeed in
expressing some of the Northern and smaller states'
opposition to the Virginia Plan.

Thereafter, the debate on

the apportionment issue became increasingly focused on
attempts to reconcile demands of the South and the large
states for a legislature based on proportional
representation with the small states' insistence on a
legislature in which all states had an equal voice.
The critics of the New Jersey Plan remained committed
to the Virginia Plan.

By mid-June the Convention had

divided into two factions.

The supporters of the New Jersey

Plan stressed the threats of the large states' dictating to
the Congress.

Meanwhile, Alexander Hamilton, speaking for

llFarrand, Records, 1: 440.
12p o c u m e n t s , 1: 250;

Farrand,

R e c o r d s , 3:

612.
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the supporters of the Virginia Plan and against his fellow
delegates from New York, noted,
Another destructive ingredient in the [New Jersey] plan,
is that eguality of suffrage which is so much desired by
the small States. It is not in human nature that
Va. &
the large states should consent to it, of if they did
that they shd. long abide by it. It shocks too much the
ideas of Justice, and every human feeling.13
The Virginia and New Jersey Plans reached a vote on 19
June.

By a vote of seven states in favor, three against,

and one divided, the Convention agreed not to accept the
provisions of the New Jersey Plan and instead to continue
debate on the VirginiaPlan.
the Virginia Plan once again
Committee of the Whole.

As a result, the provisions

of

had to be put before the

The Convention repeated its earlier

vote in favor of a bicameral legislature in which the Senate
was elected by the state legislatures.

Additionally, on 29

June it voted in favor of establishing a different suffrage
from that of the Articles of Confederation, which provided
only one vote per state.14
By 1 July the Convention was deadlocked on the
representation issue.

In an attempt to reach some common

ground, the Convention had postponed future debate on
representation in the House and instead focused on
representation in the Senate.

On 2 July, in a close vote,

the Convention voted five states for, five against, and one
divided on a proposal for equal representation in the
13ibid., 1: 286.
14ibid.,

1:

313,

353-54,

397,

461.

18

Senate.

Realizing that the question of the apportionment of

representatives in the Congress had brought the Convention's
proceedings to a standstill, the Committee of the Whole
agreed to submit the representation question to a committee
comprised of one member from each state.15
The Grand Committee convened on 2 July.

The central

question facing it was how the larger states would be
prevented from dictating the government without being
subjugated to the will of the smaller states.

Three days

later the Grand Committee submitted its report to the
Committee of the Whole.

Its recommendation called for an

equal representation of all the states in the Senate and
proportional representation in the House based on a
representation of one representative for every forty
thousand persons of each state.

Additionally, each state

would have at least one member in the House of
Representatives if its total population were below forty
thousand.16
Although the principle seemed sound, the Convention
could not agree on the Grand Committee's suggestion of a
representation ratio of one to forty thousand.

Rutledege

15The Grand Committee consisted of Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts, Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Robert Yates
of New York, William Patterson of New Jersey, Benjamin
Franklin of Pennsylvania, Gunning Bedford of Delaware,
Luther Martin of Maryland, George Mason of Virginia, William
Richardson Davie of North Carolina, John Rutledge of South
Carolina, and Abraham Baldwin of Georgia. Ibid., 1: 509.
1 6 i b i d . , 1: 542.
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proposed a change to the Grand Committee's report that would
have fixed apportionment on each state's proportional
contribution to taxes rather than on population.

On 6 July,

after it became clear that debate on the representation
ratio had brought the Convention's proceedings to yet
another standstill, the representation ratio was submitted
to another special committee.

That committee, comprised of

Robert Morris of Pennsylvania, Nathaniel Gorham of
Massachusetts, Randolph, Rutledge, and King, was to debate
the representation ratio specifically.

Meanwhile, on 7

July, while Morris's committee debated, the Convention once
again agreed on egual representation in the Senate.17
Although the Convention had agreed to equal
representation in the Senate, the central issue of the
representation debate remained unsettled.

The Convention

was unable to reach a consensus on how to apportion
representation in the House of Representatives.

On both 9

and 10 July Morris's committee submitted proposals to the
Committee of the Whole. Both those plans involved setting
the number of representatives in the First House at a fixed
number and called for a census to provide information for an
apportionment of representatives at a later date.

After

motions by the North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia
delegates to increase the respective apportionment in the

l^Elliot,
549 .

D e b a t e s , 1:

194;

Farrand,

Records,

1: 538,
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new Congress failed, the Convention took up the census as
its new focus of debate.18
The representation ratio debate was therefore preempted
by the census debate for two days.

On 11 and 12 July the

Convention debated the frequency of the census.
From the Morris committee’s original proposal of a census in
fifteen years, the Convention finally agreed to conducting
one within six years of the government's formation and one
every ten years thereafter.

Representation, meanwhile,

would be apportioned in accordance with a constitutional
mandate prior to the first census.

The significant

provision of the census compromise was to base the census on
both the states' free inhabitants and slave population,
utilizing the three-fifths clause.19
After the census debate the representation issue again
appeared stuck at a standstill.

The Committee of the Whole

agreed to reconsider the Grand Committee's original report.
But before that report could be read, Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts offered a new resolution to the Convention.
Hoping to alert the Convention to the political threat
poised by the country's rapidly increasing western
population, he submitted the following proposition:
That to secure the liberties of the States already
Confederated, the number of representatives in the first
branch from the States which shall hereafter be
established, shall never exceed the representatives from
18ibid., 1: 557, 563.
19lbid.,

1: 576,

590;

Elliot,

D e b a t e s , 1:

91.

21

such of the thirteen United States as shall acceded to
this Confederation.20
Although Gerry’s proposition was defeated, it was indicative
of the Eastern states' concerns that under a system of
proportional representation their influence in the national
government would eventually be surpassed by the rapidly
expanding population on the frontier.
By mid July it was understood among the delegates that
the Convention’s work was nearly complete except for an
agreement on the apportionment issue.

Rumblings were even

heard that if an acceptable compromise on the representation
issue could not be reached it would become necessary to
dissolve the Convention.

Realizing the imminent threat to

the Constitution's future, the Committee of the Whole, on 16
July, reached a quasi-compromise.

The Grand Committee's

report was amended to include a provision to provide for
sixty-five members in the First Congress and to conduct a
census within six years of the Congress's convening.
Representation would subsequently be apportioned according
to that census.

Additionally, the three-fifths clause would

be incorporated into the Constitution for apportionment and
taxation purposes.21
The compromise of 16 July was no breakthrough; no
issues were actually settled.

It was merely a postponement

of the apportionment debate until it could be settled in the
20Farrand, Records, 2: 1.
2lElliot, Debates, 1: 205-06; Farrand, Records, 2: 7,
14-15.
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Committee of Detail, the body directly responsible for the
writing of the Constitution.
The Committee of Detail, consisting of Rutledge,
Wilson, Randolph, Gorham, and Oliver Ellsworth of
Connecticut presented its first Draft Constitution to the
Convention on 6 August.

It set the number of

representatives in the First House at sixty-five members and
established a representation ratio of one representative for
each forty thousand persons on which to apportion
representation when the country's population increased.
However, it contained neither provisions for the threefifths clause nor the specifics of a census on which to
apportion representation at a later date.22
On 8 August the Convention debated the Draft
Constitution.

Provisions to allow each state at least one

representative were immediately added to the proposed
Constitution.

An attempt to insert a clause allowing only

free citizens to be counted for apportionment purposes and
therefore negating the three-fifths clause was defeated.
But more importantly, it was agreed that representation
would be allotted according to taxation.

On 9 August the

Committee of the Whole agreed to the above changes to the
Draft Constitution.23

22ibid., 4: 221; Elliot, Debates, 1: 224; Farrand,
Records, 2: 78; Documents, 1: 261.
23Elliot, Debates, 5: 388.
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The debate over the apportionment issue temporarily
ended when the amendments to the Draft Constitution were
submitted to the Committee of Detail.

From 9 August until

14 September the Convention debated the Draft Constitution's
other provisions.

But on 14 September the apportionment

debate was revived.

Hugh Williamson of North Carolina

submitted a motion to increase the number of Representatives
in the House to over one hundred and to therefore guarantee
the smaller states at least two representatives.

After that

motion failed, another was submitted on 15 September to
increase North Carolina’s share of representation in the
First Congress.

When that motion failed, the Convention

undertook discussion of the revised Draft Constitution.24
On 17 September the Committee of Detail submitted a
significantly altered Draft Constitution to the Convention
for its approval.

The revised Constitution incorporated all

the points of the debate enumerated during the Convention.
In a guid-pro-quo for the small states' equal representation
in the Senate, it provided for proportional representation
in the House of Representatives.

That proportional

representation, along with taxes, would be based on the
states' free populations and three-fifths of their slave
populations.

The new Constitution also called for a census

within three years of the first meeting of the Congress.
After that census, representation would be apportioned in
24 ibid., 5: 541, 547.
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the House at a ratio of not more than one representative for
each thirty thousand inhabitants of each state--an increase
in the total number of representatives from the original
proposal of one representative for each forty thousand
persons.

Additionally, each state was also guaranteed at

least one representative out of a total of sixty-five in the
First House.25
On 17 September all the remaining members of the
Convention, except Randolph, Mason, and Gerry, agreed to and
signed the Constitution.26

From there, the Constitution and

the apportionment issue went to the states for debate and
ratification.

25pocuments, 1: 286.
26Elliot, Debates, 5: 559-65.

CHAPTER 3

PUBLIC ARGUMENTS AND THE REPRESENTATION DEBATE
After the Convention approved the Constitution, the
representation debate was centered in the states.

The

Constitution had established a representation ratio of not
more than one representative for each thirty thousand
persons until an apportionment could be made following the
first census.

Until that apportionment could be completed,

the Congress would consists of sixty-five members.1

Leading

up to and during the state ratification conventions, the
size of the House of Representatives became the topic of
lConstitution, art. I, sec. 2. The actual
apportionment provisions of the Constitution read:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to a Service for a Term
of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths
of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be
made within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States, and within every
subsequent Term of ten Years, in such manner as they
shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives
shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each
State shall have at Least one Representative; and until
such enumeration shall be made, the State of New
Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three,
Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence
Plantations one, Connecticut five, New York six, New
Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland
six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina
five, and Georgia three.
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spirited public debate between the supporters and the
critics of the Constitution.
The Anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution used
its apportionment clause to question the validity of the
entire Constitution.

They argued first that sixty-five

members in the House inadequately represented the mass of
the American people, and second, a representation ratio of
not more than one to thirty thousand would lead to too few
representatives after the apportionment.

They warned that

if the House membership remained small, it would evolve
quickly into a corruptible ruling aristocracy.

And as a

final caveat, they contended that the United States was too
large a nation to have only one representative for each
thirty thousand persons in the national legislature.
The Constitution's supporters, particularly James
Madison and Alexander Hamilton, answered the AntiFederalists in The Federalist Papers.

The Federalists

contended that a limited representation in the House of
Representatives was the best guarantee of American
republicanism and liberties.

They noted that the history of

republics, particularly Athens and Rome, showed that as
representative bodies grew in size, the more unwieldily they
became.

As those bodies increased, they were ruled by

demagogues supported by the "tyranny of the majority."
Therefore, if the number of representatives were increased,
the House of Representatives would use its influence with
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the masses to usurp the powers of the executive and
judiciary.
Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists
understood that the representation issue would be a deciding
factor in the Constitution's ratification.

They agreed that

"the object of every free government is the public good, and
all lesser interests yield to it."2

They determined that

the proper size of the House of Representatives should
therefore be settled in the ratifying conventions.

James

Madison, in The Federalist 55, wrote, "The true question to
be decided then is whether the smallness of the number, as a
temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty."3
The Anti-Federalists began their attacks on the
Constitution's apportionment clause almost immediately after
the Constitutional Convention's adjournment.

They noted

that the Convention had intended the House of
Representatives to serve as the vox populi.

However, it was

too restricted in size to serve the people's interests
adequately.

As one opponent of the Constitution noted, for

2"Brutus IV," 29 November 1787, in Herbert J. Storing,
ed., The Complete Anti-Federalist, 7 vols.
(Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1981), 2: 382 (hereinafter
cited as Anti-Federalist).
3"Strictures on the Proposed Constitution" from
Philadelphia Freeman's Journal, 26 September 1787, John P.
Kaminski and others, eds., Commentaries on the Constitution:
Public and Private, vols. 13-16 of The Documentary History
of the Ratification of the Constitution, 16 vols., ed.
Merrill Jensen (Madison: State Historical Society of
Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 13: 244 (hereinafter cited as
Commentaries); Publius, The Federalist 55, from New York
Independent Journal. 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 113.
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government to serve the people, the people must have a voice
in the body responsible for making the laws by which they
were to be governed.4

Other Anti-Federalists argued that

the lower classes, particularly farmers, laborers, and small
merchants, would be unrepresented in the Congress.

"Cato"

suggested to his readers that few of them would have the
opportunity to serve in the House of Representatives.
Thomas Tudor Tucker wrote to St. George Tucker that the
House of Representatives would offer only a nominal
representation of the people, while "Brutus" wrote that
The great body of yeoman of the country cannot expect
any of their order in the assembly,. . . there is no
probability that a farmer, however respectable, will be
chosen--the mechanicks of every branch must expect to be
excluded from a seat in this Body.5
However, the Federalist authors of the Constitution
argued that the House of Representatives adeguately
represented the people.

One Federalist described the House

of Representatives as a "truly popular assembly."6

Another

4 "Brutus IV," 29 November 1787, Anti-Federalist, 2:
382 .
5"The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of
the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their
Constituents" from Pennsylvania Packet. 18 December 1787,
Commentaries, 15: 26-27; "Cato V," Anti-Federalist, 2: 119;
Thomas Tudor Tucker to St. George Tucker, 28 December 1787,
Commentaries. 15: 144; "Brutus III," 15 November 1787, AntiFederalist , 2: 381.
6"An American Citizen III: On the Federal Government"
from Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 29 September 1787,
Commentaries, 13: 272; see also Edmund Pendelton to James
Madison, 8 October 1787, William T. Hutchinson and others,
eds., The Papers of James Madison. 17 vols.
(Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1962- ), 10:
354 (hereinafter cited as Madison).
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Federalist contended that the House of Representatives would
"especially resemble the great body of the people."7

in The

Federalist 57, Madison argued that the Constitution's
provisions reguiring that members of the House be elected
every two years tied each representative closely to his
constituents' interests.

"Who," he asked, "are to be the

electors of the Federal Representatives? . . . The electors
are to be the great body of the people of the United
States."8
Alexander Hamilton was an ardent supporter of the
Constitution's apportionment provisions.

In The Federalist

35 he wrote,
The idea of an actual representation of all classes of
the people by persons of each class is altogether
visionary. Mechanicks and manufacturers will always be
inclined with few exceptions to give their votes to
merchants in preference to persons of their own
professions or trades.9
The leaders of the new government, the landed gentry,
merchants, and educated professionals, would therefore have
the masses’ sanction to represent them in the Congress.
Madison acknowledged that the upper classes' interests would
not necessarily coincide with those of the lower classes,
but "a coalition of a majority of the whole society could
7publius, The Federalist 22, from New York Packet, 14
December 1787, Commentaries, 14: 444.
8publius, The Federalist 57, from New York Packet, 19
February 1788, ibid., 16: 145.
9publius, The Federalist 35, from New York Independent
Journal, 5 January 1788, ibid., 15: 270.
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seldom take place on any other principle than those of
justice and the general good."10
Other arguments were offered against a dramatic
increase in the size of the House of Representatives.

One

Federalist suggested that an increase in the number of
representatives would place too heavy of a tax burden on the
common man.

Additionally, in The Federalist 58, Madison

questioned if the rewards of demanding that more
representatives serve in the House were worth the costs.

He

wrote: "the larger the number, the greater will be the
proportion of members limited in information and of weak
capacities."11
Both the supporters of the Constitution and its critics
argued that the American people demanded men possessing
virtue and integrity as their representatives.

However, the

Anti-Federalist doubted that such a sense of noblesse oblige
was present in most American statesmen.

They feared that if

the size of the House of Representatives were not increased,
an aristocratic clique would emerge in the Congress that
would combine with the executive and judiciary to enrich
themselves at the people's expense.

One Anti-Federalist

lOpublius, The Federalist 36, from New York Packet, 8
January 1788, ibid., 15: 302; Publius, The Federalist 51,
from New York Independent Journal, 6 February 1788, ibid.,
16: 46.
11"A Landholder IV" from Connecticut Courant, 26
December 1787, ibid., 14: 253; Publius, The Federalist 58,
from New York Independent Journal, 20 February 1788, ibid.,
16: 157.

31

wrote: "In every civilized community, even those of the most
democratic kind, there are principles which lead to an
aristocracy--there are superior talents, fortunes and
employments.12

it was therefore the founding fathers'

responsibility to assure that the legislature was incapable
of becoming a quasi House of Lords.
The Anti-Federalist claimed an increase in the number
of representatives in the House would arrest the growth of
an aristocracy.

They assumed a legislature limited in size

to only sixty-five members was bound to become corrupted by
aristocrats.

And although those same Anti-Federalists

anticipated significant growth in the country's population
over time and the admission of new states, they feared that
the limited size of the First House still poised the threat
of an aristocracy.

Richard Henry Lee therefore proposed to

Edmund Randolph that if the number of representatives were
increased in the first few Congresses, corruption in the
House would be controlled.

In "Brutus'" estimation, "The

firmest [sic] security against this kind of improper and
dangerous influence, as well as all other, is a strong and
numerous representation.

. . ."13

12"Foreign Spectator" from Pennsylvania Independent
Gazetteer, 2 October 1787, ibid., 13: 291; "George Mason,
Objections to the Constitution," 7 October 1787, ibid., 13:
348; "Cato IV" from New York Journal. 13 December 1787,
ibid., 14: 431.
13Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph, 6 December
1787, ibid., 14: 368; "Brutus IV" from ibid., 14: 298-99.
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The Federalist supporters of the Constitution argued
differently.

For the Federalists, the most basic threat to

republican government was not an aristocratic clique, but
the tumult of the masses.

In The Federalist 55, Madison

wrote,
In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever characters
composed, passion never fails to unrest the scepter from
reason. Had every Athenian been a Socrates; every
Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.14
In both The Federalist 51 and The Federalist 49. Madison and
Hamilton warned that republican government must not only
guard against oppression by tyrannical rulers, but also
against the tyranny of the majority.

An increase in the

size of the House would only lead to a demagogic Congress
that usurped the power of the executive and the judiciary.
Madison, in The Federalist 48, warned that "the legislative
department is everywhere extending the sphere of its
activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex."15
Although several Anti-Federalists saw a plot to create
an aristocracy, Federalist authors doubted that those
elected to the House of Representatives would desire to
14publius, The Federalist 55. from New York Independent
Journal. 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 112.
15publius, The Federalist 51, from New York Independent
Journal, 6 February 1788, ibid., 16: 46; Publius, The
Federalist 49. from New York Independent Journal. 2 February
1788, ibid., 16: 18; Publius, The Federalist 48 from New
York Packet, 1 February 1788, ibid., 16: 4; see also Edmund
Pendleton to James Madison, 8 October 1787, Madison, 10:
188.

33

create a ruling elite dedicated to oppressing the masses.
In The Federalist 55, Madison contended that it was unlikely
that the American people "will chuse, and every second year
repeat the choice of sixty-five or an hundred men, who would
be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or
treachery."16
The Federalists prided themselves on their
understanding of man's political nature.

And while they

acknowledged that there were factors in human nature that
led to inequalities in men's abilities, those factors also
suggested that some men were more capable of ruling than
others.

As such, the Anti-Federalist Mercy Otis Warren

inadvertently described the Federalist position when she
wrote:
Every age has its Bruiti and its Decii, as well as its
Caesars and Sejani . . . America may yet produce
characters who have a genius and capacity sufficient to
form the manners and correct the morals of the people,
and virtue enough to lead their country to freedom.17
The Anti-Federalist also contended that the size of the
United States should have an impact on the number of
Representatives apportioned in the House.

They argued that

republicanism could not survive in a country as large as the
United States.

As students of Montesquieu's Spirit of the

Laws, they assumed that it was natural for a republic to
16publius, The Federalist 55, from New York Independent
Journal, 13 February 1788, ibid., 16: 113.
1 7 "A Co l u mb ia n Patriot: Ob se rv a ti o n s
Constit uti on " ibid., 16: 288.
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flourish only in a small territory.

"Brutus" argued that a

free republic could not succeed in a country as large as the
United States.

He contended that to limit the size of the

House of Representatives would only lead to a widely spread
populace without proper representation.

He argued that no

practical number of representatives could be found to
represent adequately the interests and sentiments of the
citizens of such a vast continent.

"An Old Whig IV" stated:

"The continent of the North-America can no more be governed
by one Republic, than the fabled Atlas could support the
heavens."18
Luther Martin was a vocal critic of the Constitution.
He stated that the people of the United States were too
separated by large distances for republicanism to extend to
them.

With only sixty-five members in the House of

Representatives, it was unlikely that all the varying
interests would have a voice in the Congress.

Mercy Otis

Warren similarly noted,
The difficulty, if not impracticability of exercising
the equal and equitable powers of government by a single
legislature over an extent of territory . . . is a
18"Cato III" from New York Independent Journal, 25
October 1787, ibid., 13: 474; "Letters from the Federal
Farmer to the Republican," 8 October 1787, Anti-Federalist,
2: 230; "Centinel III" from Pennsylvania Independent
Gazetteer, 8 November 1787, Commentaries, 14: 61; "Brutus
III" from New York Journal, 15 November 1787, ibid., 14:
119; "The Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania
Convention" from Pennsylvania Packet, 18 December 1787,
ibid., 15: 26; "Curtipolis" from New York Daily Advertiser,
18 January 1788, ibid., 15: 400; "An Old Whig IV" from
Pennsylvania Independent Gazetteer, 27 October 1787, ibid.,
13: 500.
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inseparable objection to the adoption of the new
system.19
Madison, in The Federalist 56, answered the AntiFederalist argument that the United States was too large a
nation for republicanism to reach all its citizens.

He

argued that the common body of representatives would have
access to the knowledge of each district's representatives:
"Whilst a few representatives therefore from each state may
bring with them a due knowledge of their own state, every
representative will have much information to acquire
concerning all the other states."20

However, to insist that

each representative be knowledgeable of every minute detail
concerning each group's interests was unreasonable.

In the

same essay, Madison wrote that "an ignorance of minute and
particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of
legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to
a due performance of the legislative truths."21
The debate surrounding the size of the House of
Representatives would continue even after the Constitution's
ratification in 1788.

The critics of the apportionment

clause refused to accept that the number of representatives
in the House would remain small.

Even Madison, after he had

19"Luther Martin: Genuine Information XI" from
Baltimore Maryland Gazette, 5 February 1788, ibid., 16: 40;
"A Columbian Patriot: Observation of the Constitution"
ibid., 16: 282.
20publius, The Federalist 56. in New York Independent
Journal, 16 February 1788, ibid., 16: 131.
21Publius, The Federalist 56, in New York Independent
Journal. 16 February 1788, ibid., 16: 130.
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helped secure the Constitution's ratification through the
authorship of The Federalist Papers, abandoned Hamilton and
argued for an immediate increase in the size of the House.
Madison's efforts to placate the Anti-Federalists' arguments
against a House of Representatives limited in size virtuallyassured that the representation issue would be debated in
the First Congress.

C HA P T E R 4

THE FIRST CONGRESS AND THE APPORTIONMENT AMENDMENT
The ratification debates in the states indicated that
many Americans were opposed to the Constitution.

One

particular point of contention was the Constitution’s clause
apportioning representation in the House of Representatives.
And while opposition to that clause was not significant
enough to prevent ratification of the Constitution, it
became the subject of several proposed constitutional
amendments in the state ratifying conventions.
Pennsylvania's ratifying convention was the first body
to suggest that the Constitution's apportionment clause was
flawed.

The Pennsylvania convention voted to ratify the

Constitution on 12 December 1787 by a vote of forty-six to
twenty-three.

However, the convention's sizable minority

suggested fifteen amendments in "The Address and Reasons of
Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constitution, 1787."

Those amendments

were intended to provide the American people with a bill of
rights guaranteeing their liberties.

The tenth amendment

dealt specifically with the apportionment of representatives
in the House of Representatives.

In a guarantee that the

selection of representatives would remain free, the
Pennsylvania minority's amendment read, "That the house of
37
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representatives be properly increased in number."1

The

Pennsylvania minority argued that the sixty-five members
scheduled to comprise the House under the Constitution were
inadequate.

They contended that the American people's

liberties, interests, and happiness would be dependent upon
the views of a body of representatives too small to
represent them fully and too prone to the chief executive's
influence.2
There was also opposition to the Constitution's
apportionment clause in the Massachusetts ratifying
convention.

While it is not known whether the Massachusetts

delegates were directly influenced by the Pennsylvania
minority, nine amendments were proposed to the Constitution
in the convention’s notification of ratification on 6
February 1788.

Like the Pennsylvania minority's tenth

amendment, the Massachusetts convention's second amendment
referred to the apportionment of representatives in the
House.

In an effort to increase the size of the House,

Massachusetts proposed "That there shall be one
representative to every thirty thousand persons, according
l"The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of
the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to their
Constituents" from Pennsylvania Packet. 18 December 1787,
John P. Kaminski and others, eds., Commentaries on the
Constitution; Public and Private, vols. 13-16 of The
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution,
16 vols., ed. Merrill Jensen (Madison: State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1976-1986), 15: 26 (hereinafter cited
as Commentaries).
2 Ibid.
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to the census mentioned in the Constitution, until the whole
number of representatives amounts to two hundred."3
Four months later, the New Hampshire convention
ratified the Constitution.

As the ninth state to do so, it

brought the Constitution into effect according to the terms
of the seventh article.

But in its ratification message of

21 June 1788, the convention submitted twelve Constitutional
amendments.

The first nine were taken almost verbatim from

those of Massachusetts.

In the New Hampshire list the

second amendment was an apportionment proposal that was
identical to the one submitted by Massachusetts.4
Although the Constitution came into effect with New
Hampshire's ratification, the largest and most influential
state, Virginia, had failed to ratify it.

Like their

counterparts in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New
Hampshire, the opponents of the Constitution in Virginia
demanded that it be amended to provide the people with a
bill of rights.

On 27 June the Virginia convention

acquiesced to those demands and agreed to propose twenty
constitutional amendments, including an apportionment
amendment.

Whereas the Pennsylvania minority's amendment

had called for an increase in the number of representatives
3Massachusetts Convention Debates, 1788, Bernard
Schwartz and others, eds., The Bill of Rights: A Documentary
History, 2 vols. (New York: Chelsa House Publishing, 1971),
2: 713 (hereinafter cited as Bill of Rights).
4New Hampshire Proposed Amendments, 1788, ibid., 2:
760.
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in the House, and Massachusetts and New Hampshire suggested
a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand until the
number of representatives reached two hundred, Virginia's
second amendment combined both those suggestions into one
proposal.

It read:

That there shall be one representative for every thirty
thousand according to the enumeration or census in the
Constitution until the whole number of representatives
amounts to two hundred; after which, the number shall be
continued or increased, as Congress shall direct, upon
the principle fixed in the Constitution, by apportioning
representatives of each state to some greater number,
from time to time, as population increases.5
Opposition to the Constitution’s apportionment clause
continued in the New York ratifying convention.

In its

ratification message of 26 July 1788, the New York
convention proposed an apportionment amendment as the first
of thirty-two possible amendments.

George Mason claimed

that New York's amendments were modeled on those he had
helped draft in the Virginia convention, and as evidence of
his claim, the two proposals were almost verbatim, with only
one minor difference.

New York's amendment stated that once

the number of representatives was increased, that number
"shall be continued or encreased but not diminished."6
The North Carolina ratification convention assembled in
July 1788.

That convention voted neither to ratify nor

reject the Constitution.

However, in keeping with the other

5virginia Ratifying C
o
n
ve
n
tio
n
,

1788,

ibid.,

2: 842-43.

6For reference to Mason's letter, see ibid., 2: 855;
New York Proposed Amendments, 1788, ibid., 2: 915.
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opponents of the Constitution, it issued a "Declaration of
Rights" and suggested twenty-six amendments to be added to
the Constitution when eventually ratified.

Virginia's

amendments had an obvious influence on those of North
Carolina.

In fact, North Carolina's second amendment was an

exact copy of Virginia's apportionment amendment.7
Before the First Congress convened in March 1789, James
Madison considered the significance of the amendments
proposed in the state ratifying conventions.

Pennsylvania,

Massachusetts, Maryland, South Carolina, New Hampshire,
Virginia, New York, and North Carolina had all proposed
amendments to the Constitution.

Of those states, six,

Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Virginia, New
York, and North Carolina, had proposed apportionment
amendments.

Madison determined that a list of

constitutional amendments should therefore be proposed in
the First Congress.

In a tract composed for his campaign

for election to the House of Representatives, Madison
stated:
It is my wish, particularly, to see specific provision
made on the subject of the Rights of Conscience, the
Freedom of the Press, Trials by Jury, Exemption from
General Warrants, &c, to see effective provision made
also for the periodical increase of the representatives,
until the number shall amount to the fullest security.8
7N
o
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ibid.,

2:

915.
8james Madison to a Resident of Spotslyvania County, 27
January, William T. Hutchinson and others, eds., The Papers
of James Madison, 17 vols. (Charlotesville: University Press
of Virginia, 1962- ), 11: 428 (hereinafter cited as
Madison). **
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To Thomas Mann Randolph he suggested that the Constitution
should be amended to include the Anti-Federalist position
that the number of representatives should be increased, and
to secure the Federalist argument that the total number of
representatives would eventually be limited.

He wrote:

I think also that periodical increase of the House of
Representatives, until it attains a certain number,
ought to be expressly provided for, instead of being
left to the direction of the government.9
Madison realized that the burden of submitting those
amendments to the Constitution would rest on him.

More

pressing issues would face the First Congress when it
convened; the United States had no machinery for the
collection of taxes, no federal judiciary, and virtually no
army.

But after sifting througn a collection of the two

hundred plus proposed amendments submitted by the states, he
wrote to Thomas Jefferson on 17 October 1789 that he had
completed a list of amendments declaring the most basic
rights.10
Madison got the opportunity to prepare the House of
Representatives to receive those amendments.

George

Washington asked him to assist in the writing of the first
9james Madison to Thomas Mann Randolph, 13 January
1789, ibid., 11: 416; Madison also wrote to George Eve on 2
January 1789 that "the Constitution ought to be revised, and
that the first Congress meeting under it ought to prepare
and recommend to the states for ratification, the most
satisfactory provisions for all essential rights. . . . "
ibid., 11: 405.
lOjames Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 17 October 1789,
ibid., 11: 297.
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inaugural address.

In that address, on 30 April 1789, the

President reminded the Congress that several state ratifying
conventions had called for amendments to the Constitution.
But, the President noted, "Instead of undertaking particular
recommendations on this subject . . .

I shall give way to my

entire confidence in your [the Congress's] discernment and
pursuit of the public good."11
Madison also drafted the House reply to Washington's
inaugural address.

In response to Washington's suggestion

that the Congress prepare a list of amendments to the
Constitution, Madison wrote that
the question arising out of the fifth article of the
Constitution, will receive all the attention demanded by
its importance; and will, we trust, be decided, under
the influence of all the consideration to which you
allude.12
On 25 May 1789, the day the First House had scheduled
to begin discussion of amendments, the Committee of the
Whole agreed to postpone consideration of any constitutional
amendments until 8 June.

Madison noted that prior to 25 May

very little had been mentioned privately or publicly in the
Congress regarding amendments to the Constitution.

Research

in contemporary newspapers also showed that the topic of
proposed constitutional amendments received virtually no
mention.

From April through late May the members of the

llJames D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages
and the Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 20 vols.
(Washington: GPO, 1897), 1: 53.
12Gazette of the United States. 2 May 1789.
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House had focused on what they considered to be the more
pressing issues of establishing a means of revenue for the
federal government and the organization of the executive
branch.13
Finally, on 8 June, Madison submitted his nineteen
amendments to the Committee of the Whole.

Twelve days

earlier he had written to Jefferson to tell him that a "Bill
of rights, incorporated perhaps into the Constitution will
be proposed, with few alterations most called for by the
opponents of the Government and least objectionable to its
friends."14
Madison's reasons for submitting the amendments to the
Constitution were based on more than politics.

Although he

had originally been one of the Constitution's most ardent
supporters, he realized that it was not a perfect document.
And although his primary purpose was to prove that the
Federalist supporters of the Constitution were friends of
liberty, he hoped the amendments would also remove those
sections of the Constitution he felt to be iniquitous—
namely the lack of a Bill of Rights.

Additionally, by

13ibid., 27 May 1789.
14james Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 13 Jun 1789,
Madison, 12: 218; Madison wrote several associates to tell
them of his plan to submit a list of amendments to The
Constitution. He noted in all those letters that he was not
proposing any amendment that was too controversial to pass
two-thirds of the Congress and three-fourths of the states.
See James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 21 June 1789, ibid.,
12: 272; James Madison to George Nicholas, 5 July 1789,
ibid., 12: 282.
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amending the Constitution, Madison hoped to encourage Rhode
Island and North Carolina to ratify and join the Union.

And

last, and his most significant contribution to the
constitutional debate, he felt that his nineteen amendments
would strengthen the Constitution for later generations.15
Madison's second amendment dealt specifically with the
Constitution's representation ratio.

The Constitution's

first article, second section, third clause, established a
representation ratio of not more than one representative for
every thirty thousand persons until a reapportionment could
be made following the Census of 1790.

Madison proposed

amending that clause to read:
After the first actual enumeration, there shall be one
Representative for every thirty thousand, until the
number amounts to _____, after which the proportion
shall be so regulated that the number shall never be
less than _____, nor more than _____ , but each State
shall, after the first enumeration, have at least two
Representatives; and prior thereto.16
He assumed that during debate the Committee of the Whole
would insert the number in the blanks acceptable to most
representatives.
The nation's press duly reported the submission of
Madison's amendments.

But unfortunately, no analysis of

those amendments was offered.

However, we must remember

that the apportionment amendment was just one of many
15Notes for Speech in Congress, ca. 8 June 1789, ibid.,
12: 193-95.
16pebates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United
States, 1789-1824 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834-56),
42 vols. 1: 434 (hereinafter cited as Annals of Congress).

46

amendments.

Perhaps it was felt that there were too many

amendments to discuss in the press or that they were best
left in the care of the House of Representatives.
The House returned to Madison's apportionment proposal
on 21 July.

On 15 June, Madison had written to Edmund

Randolph to note, "The article which I fear most for is that
which respects representation."17

And while debate in the

House had focused on the whole range of Madison's eighteen
other amendments, no finalized version of those amendments
had been agreed to in the House.

The Committee of the Whole

therefore formed a committee comprised of one member from
each state to prepare a final list of amendments for
submittal to the states.

The Committee of Eleven, as it

became known, consisted of Madison, John Vining of Delaware,
Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, Roger Sherman of Connecticut,
Aedanus Burke of South Carolina, Nicholas Gilman of New
Hampshire, George Clymer of Pennsylvania, Egbert Benson of
New York, Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts, Elias Boudinot
of New Jersey, and George Gale of Maryland.

Seven days

later the committee made its report to the Committee of the
Whole.18
On 14 August the House considered the Committee of
Eleven's amendments to the Constitution.

The committee had

proposed seventeen amendments; the second was an
17James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 15 June 1789,
Madison. 12: 219.
18Gazette of the United States, 19 August 1789.
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apportionment amendment.

Similar to Madison's original

proposal, it would have revised the Constitution's
representation ratio to read,
after the first enumeration, there shall be one
representative for every thirty thousand, until the
number shall amount to one hundred. After which the
proportion shall be so regulated by Congress that the
number of representatives shall never be less than one
hundred, nor more than one hundred and seventy five; but
each state shall always have at least one
representative.19
The committee's apportionment amendment incorporated
all the suggestions of the apportionment amendments proposed
by the states.

Virginia and North Carolina's amendments can

been seen as the logical model for the new amendment.

It

included the Anti-Federalist and the Pennsylvania minority's
suggestion that the number of representatives in the House
be increased.

As for the Federalists, the amendment

included Massachusetts and New Hampshire's recommendation
that the number of representatives should be limited at a
fixed number.

New York's suggestion that once the increase

in the number of representatives was made that at no point
should it be decreased was also incorporated into the new
amendment.
The committee's amendment, like Madison's earlier
amendment, would have significantly increased the number of
representatives in the House.

Although the First Census had

yet to be completed, it was assumed that the House, if the
amendment passed, would be increased to over one hundred
l^Annals of Congress, 1: 719.
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members.

As early as the Confederation period, it was

acknowledged that the population of the United States was
over three million persons.

With three million inhabitants,

representation in the House would be increased and
reapportioned among the states.
In a preview of later debate in the Second Congress,
the Committee of the Whole took that increase and
reapportionment as the focus of its debate.

Vining, one of

the leaders of the apportionment debate in both the First
and Second Congresses, unsuccessfully moved to guarantee
each state at least two representatives if its total
population amounted to forty-five thousand persons.20
Fisher Ames of Massachusetts then proposed increasing the
representation ratio in the amendment to one representative
for each forty thousand persons.
Ames hoped that by increasing the representation ratio
/

he could limit the increase in the size of the House.
Although that increase was inevitable, the Federalists still
hoped to control its size.

Ames therefore presented three

arguments against a radical increase in the number of
representatives in the House.

First, limiting the

membership in the House of Representatives would save the
people approximately $450,000, by Ames's estimation,
resulting from an increase of the size the committee had
proposed.

Second, Ames contented "that, in proportion as

20ibid., 1: 719-20.
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you increase the number of Representatives, the body
degenerates; you diminish the individual usefulness."21

And

third, an increase in the number of representatives would
lead to "an excitement of or fermentation in the
representative body.

Numerous assemblies are supposed to be

less under the guidance of reason than smaller ones."22
Ames’s arguments failed to convince either Michael
Stone of Maryland or the Committee of the Whole.

Stone

contended that a ratio of one representatives for every
thirty thousand persons was needed to guarantee the people's
liberties; the more representatives, the better.

He noted

that in a population of three million persons, a ratio of
one to thirty thousand would permit only one hundred
representatives--a dangerously small number.

Of that one

hundred, fifty-one members formed a quorum and twenty-six
comprised a majority of that quorum.

Combined with the

seven Senators needed for a majority in that body, Stone
contended that a mere thirty-three individuals could decide
the United States' future.

The Committee of the Whole

agreed with Stone that the American republic could not
afford to reduce its future number of representatives by
one-forth and hope to remain free.

It therefore

overwhelmingly rejected Ames's proposal.23
21lbid., 1: 720.
22ibid.
23ibid., 1: 725.
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Following Stone's comments, Theodore Sedgwick of
Massachusetts successfully moved to substitute two hundred
for one hundred seventy-five in the amendment as the maximum
number of representatives allowed in the House.

He believed

that a House of Representatives of only one hundred seventyfive members would be a body too small to represent properly
the divergent interests throughout the United States.
no surprise that Sedgwick submitted his proposal.

It is

The

apportionment amendment proposed by the Massachusetts
ratifying convention called for two hundred representatives
in the House.

Sedgwick, who served as a delegate from

Berkshire County to his state's ratifying convention, surely
found his inspiration for his proposal in that convention's
proposed constitutional amendments.24
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire stated that he was
not satisfied with the apportionment amendment.

As the

amendment was written, it contained no provisions for the
periodic increase of representatives in the House.

Taking

the Virginia, New York, and Madison amendments as his model,
Livermore proposed to add a clause to Congress's amendment
stating that as the United States' population increased, so
would representation in the House.

As the last order of

business for the day, Livermore's proposal was incorporated
into the House version of the apportionment amendment.25
24ibid.;

Bill o
f Rights.
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Before the House could take its vote on the Committee
of Eleven's other amendments, Roger Sherman, on 19 August,
successfully moved that the amendments be added to the
Constitution as separate articles, not as changes to the
Constitution's existing text.26

Five days later the House

sent its finalized list of seventeen amendments to the
Senate for its concurrence.

The first of those amendments

was the apportionment amendment.

It read:

After the first enumeration required by the first
Article of the Constitution, there shall be one
Representative for every thirty thousand, until the
number shall amount to one hundred, after which the
proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there
shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor
less than one Representatives for every forty thousand
persons, until the number of Representatives shall
amount to two hundred, after which there shall not be
less than two hundred Representatives, nor less than one
Representatives for every fifty thousand persons.27
One will note that the House version of the
apportionment amendment sent to the Senate on 24 August is
significantly different from the amendment discussed and
passed by the Committee of the Whole on 14 August.

But the

records of the discussion of amendments in the Committee of
the Whole made no mention of a ratio of one representative
to forty thousand inhabitants until the number of
representatives in the Congress reached two hundred, or a
26ibid., 1: 766.
27The Journal of the
the Executive Proceedings
Greenleaf, 1789; reprint,
Wilmington, Del.: Michael
references are to reprint
Senate Journal).

Senate Including the Journal of
of the Senate (New York: Thomas
9 vols., Martin P. Claussen, ed.,
Glazier, Inc., 1977), 1: 104 (page
edition; hereinafter cited as
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ratio of not less than one to fifty thousand after the
number.

Unfortunately, neither the House Journal nor the

Annals of Congress mention the proceedings in which the
amendment was altered.

Additionally, no contemporary

newspapers reported the proceedings that changed the
amendment.

Therefore, there is a ten day period, from 14

August to 24 August 1789, during which significant changes
were made to the apportionment amendment.

However, the

details of the debate surrounding those changes were not
recorded in any available contemporary source.
On 2 September the Senate considered the House
apportionment amendment.

A motion to increase the minimum

number of representatives from one hundred to two hundred
failed.

The Senate then changed the House amendment to read

that after the first one hundred representatives were
apportioned in the House, one additional representative
would be added for each increase of forty thousand in the
nation's population.

Once the membership in the House

reached two hundred, the ratio would be reduced to one
additional representative for each increase in population of
sixty thousand.28
One week later the Senate passed its final list of
amendments.

The next day the House of Representatives

received the Senate list.

Madison noted the list and wrote

to Edmund Pendleton that "the Senate have sent back the plan
28ibid

1: 117.
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of amendments with some alterations which strike in my
opinion at the most salutary articles."29

On 21 September

the House voted to disagree with several of the Senate’s
amendments, including the apportionment amendment.

However,

the House also agreed that a conference committee be
established between the two houses to discuss the
amendments.

Madison, Sherman, and Vining were selected to

serve as the House managers of the committee.

That same

day, after notification of the House decision, the Senate
chose Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut, Charles Carroll of
Maryland, and William Patterson of New Jersey to meet the
House committee representatives in hope of reaching an
agreement on the amendments to the Constitution.30
On 23 September Madison again wrote to Pendleton.

In

his letter he noted that the Congress would soon adjourn,
and rather than risk forfeiture of all the amendments, he
was willing to accept the Senate list with minor changes.
The same day, both the House of Representatives and the
Senate heard the Conference Report.

The report suggested

that the Senate accept the House version of the
apportionment amendment if the last line of the amendment
were changed to read, "that there shall be not less than two
29james Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 14 September 1789,
Madison, 12: 402.
30jpurnal of the House of Representatives (New York:
Francis Childs and John Swaine, 1789; reprint, 9 vols.,
Martin P. Claussen, ed., Wilmington, Del.: Michael Glazier,
Inc., 1977), 1: 151 (page references are to reprint edition;
hereinafter cited as House Journal).
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hundred Representatives, nor more than one Representative
for every fifty thousand persons."31

The final

apportionment amendment would therefore read:
After the first enumeration required by the first
Article of the Constitution, there shall be one
Representative for every thirty thousand, until the
number shall amount to one hundred, after which the
proportion shall be so regulated by Congress, that there
shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor
less than one Representative for every forty thousand
persons, until the number of Representatives shall
amount to two hundred, after which time the proportion
shall be so regulated by Congress, that there shall not
be less than two hundred Representatives, nor less than
one Representatives for every fifty thousand persons.32
On 24 September the House agreed to the Conference
report by a vote of thirty-seven in favor and fourteen
opposed.

The next day the Senate concurred in the

amendments as approved by the House.

A total of twelve

amendments were submitted to President Washington who
forwarded them to the states one week later.

The first of

those amendments was the apportionment amendment and the
second prohibited the Congress from granting itself a mid
term pay raise.

The remaining ten amendments were the

guarantees of liberties that eventually became the Bill of

3
1ja
m
e
s Madison to Edmund Pendleton, 23 September 1789,
Madison, 12: 418; Senate Journal, 1: 145.

32u.s. Congress. House. The Constitution of the United
States of America as amended through July 1971, Analytical
Index. Unratified Amendments. 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972.
House Doc. 92-157. (Washington: GPO, 1972), 25 (hereinfater
cited as Analytical Index).
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Rights.

Washington forwarded them to the states one week

later.33
Once in the states, the supporters of the amendments
hoped for a guick ratification by ten of the states.

But

Edward Carrington, in a letter to Madison, noted that the
ratification of the apportionment amendment would be
difficult.

In considering the amendments, he noted,

One of them which seems at present to be much approved
of & was indeed made a considerable object of by all the
States, will not, I apprehend, be found good in
practice--I mean the excessive enlargement of the
representation. . . .34
Unfortunately we know little of what transpired in the
ratification conventions in the states.

There are no

journals for the state conventions comparable to the House
Journal or the Annals of Congress.

Yet, there must have

been some divisions within those conventions.

Final

ratification of the Bill of Rights by the reguired threefourths of the states was not completed until 1792.
Additionally, three of the original thirteen states,
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Georgia, did not ratify the
Bill of Rights until 1939.35
The apportionment amendment addressed the AntiFederalists ' demand that the House be increased in size and
3
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yet met the Federalists' insistence that the House of
Representatives remain limited in membership.

Therefore it

faced little opposition in the early stages of the
ratification debates in the states.

On 25 January 1790,

President Washington transmitted Maryland's message of
ratification to the Congress.

On 19 December, Maryland's

Senate had agreed with its House of Delegates to ratify all
twelve of the proposed amendments.

Twenty days later

Washington presented the Congress with another ratification
message.

On 29 January the New Hampshire legislature had

ratified all the amendments except the second--the amendment
prohibiting the Congress from granting itself a mid-term pay
raise.36

it appeared as if Carrington had perhaps

underestimated the support for the apportionment amendment.
But the supporters of the apportionment amendment
suffered a defeat on 8 March.

Washington submitted to the

Congress Delaware's ratification message.

In it, the

Governor of Delaware notified Washington that his state
legislature had ratified all the proposed constitutional
amendments except the first.

Eight days later, the

apportionment amendment was rejected by another state.

The

36House Journal, 2: 18-19; New York Journal and Weekly
Register. 10 December 1789; House Journal, 2: 35-36; New
York Journal and Weekly Register, 11 February 1790; United
States Chronicle, 21 February 1790.
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Pennsylvania legislature had voted, like Delaware's, to
accept all the proposed amendments except the first.37
Pennsylvania's refusal to ratify the apportionment
amendment virtually assured that it would not become part of
the Bill of Rights.

Although Washington submitted

ratification notices for South Carolina on 1 April, New York
on 5 April, North Carolina on 25 May, Rhode Island on 30
June, and New Jersey on 4 August, it was clear that the
apportionment amendment would not have the support of the
required ten states for incorporation into the Bill of
Rights.38
It made little difference that Vermont, after being
admitted to the Union on 4 March 1791, ratified the proposed
first amendment.

The apportionment amendment then had the

support of eight states, but it remained three short of the
ratification of the required three-fourths of the states.
Although Virginia finally ratified all twelve proposed
amendments to the Constitution on 15 December 1791, the
apportionment amendment died.39
Eleven of the fourteen states ratified amendments III
though XII of the Congress's proposed list.

Those ten

37House Journal, 2: 49-50; New York Journal and Weekly
Register, 18 February 1790; House Journal, 2: 56; New York
Journal and Weekly Register, 25 March 1790.
38House Journal. 2: 71, 73, 137-38, 154, 202-03; New
York Journal and Weekly Register, 19 November 1789; The
Massachusetts Spy, 3 December 1789.
39Analvtical Index, 12.
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amendments were added to the Constitution as the Bill of
Rights.

Only six states ratified the proposed second

amendment.

The apportionment amendment was ratified by nine

of the required eleven states.

The attempt to pass a

constitutional amendment guaranteeing a periodic increase in
the size of the House of Representatives had failed.

The

debate over the size of the House would therefore shift to
the Second Congress as the supporters of an increase in the
size of the House would attempt to pass apportionment
legislation guaranteeing that increase by statute law.

C H AP T E R 5

THE REPRESENTATION DEBATE IN THE SECOND CONGRESS
By October 1791 the apportionment debate was again
before the Congress.

The proposed first amendment to the

Constitution had passed only six of the eleven states
required for ratification.

The debate over the

apportionment of representatives in the House remained
unsettled.

Proponents of a larger House of Representatives

therefore set out to pass regular statute law to increase
the number of representatives in the House.
The Second Congress convened on 24 October 1791.
apportionment issued surfaced one week later.

The

John

Laurance, a representative from New York, started the debate
when he submitted an apportionment resolution in the House
of Representatives.

House Resolution 147 read: "That till

the time of the next enumeration, the number of
Representatives shall be one to every thirty thousand
inhabitants."1
Laurance's resolution had significant implications for
the make-up of the House of Representatives.

Laurance

proposed increasing the number of representatives in the
^Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United
States, 1789-1834 (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1834-56),
42 vols. 3: 148 (hereinafter cited as Annals of Congress).
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House from the constitutionally mandated sixty-five to one
hundred and twelve.

Based on the Census of 1790, Laurance's

resolution would have been a political windfall for the
South and the larger Mid-Atlantic States.

The South would

garner twenty-two additional representatives in the
reapportionment.

New York and Pennsylvania could expect to

gain eleven representatives between them.

But the New

England states would gain a total of only thirteen
additional members in the House of Representatives (see
table 1).
New Englanders realized the political threat posed by
Laurance's resolution.

Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts

argued that although the Constitution provided for a
representation ratio no greater than one representative for
each thirty thousand persons, he preferred to see the number
of representatives in the House limited to one hundred.
Samuel Livermore of New Hampshire seconded Sedgwick's
sentiments.

He was in favor of any ratio that would lead to

the smallest number of representatives possible.

Another

Northerner, Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey, noted that his
constituents were opposed to any significant increase in the
number of representatives in the House.2
On 3 November the Committee of the Whole considered
Laurance's resolution.

Sedgwick contended that the

representation ratio in Laurance's resolution was too small.

2 I b i d . , 3:

149.
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Table 1
Representatives Apportioned under the
Constitution and Proposed H.R. 1473
New Enaland States
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut

Constitution
0
3
8
1
5

Middle States
New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware

Southern States
Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

Total
—

H.R. 147
2
4
15
2
7

Gain
2
1
7
1
2

17

30

13

6
4
8
1

11
5
14
1

5
1
6
0

19

31

12

6
10
0
5
5
3

9
21
2
11
6
2

3
11
2
6
1
-1

29

51

22

65

112

47

Note: Vermont was admitted to the Union on 4 March 1791
Kentucky was admitted 1 June 1792.

3President Washington transmitted a summary of the
results of the Census of 1790 to the Congress on 27 October
1791. Heads of Families at the First Census of the United
States Taken in the Year 1790: Vermont (Baltimore:
Genealogical Publishing Company, 1966), 4 (hereinafter cited
as Census 1790). Constitution, art. I, sec. 2. Author's own
calculations for the number of representatives apportioned
to each state. It is significant to note that the number of
representatives apportioned in Laurance's resolution was
identical to the number that would have been apportioned
under the apportionment amendment in the First Congress.
See Appendix 6 for the population figures found in the
Census of 1790. All population figures used for
apportionment are based on each state's free population and
three-fifths of its slave population.
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He proposed limiting the size of the House to one hundred
members by increasing the ratio to one representative for
each thirty-four thousand inhabitants.

Livermore went even

further and argued for a ratio of one to forty thousand.
Abraham Clark of New Jersey stated that since the people of
the United States were concerned over the expenses of
maintaining the government, any increase in the number of
representatives in the House should be considered with
caution--a reapportionment of representatives would surely
unnecessarily increase the government's expenses.

He

seconded Livermore's proposal in hope of limiting the House
to eighty-one members.4
Laurance objected to Livermore's proposal.

He

contended that when the Constitution was ratified in 1788,
the majority of Americans had agreed to the ratio of one
representative for each thirty thousand persons.

Clark's

objections that an increase in the number of representatives
in the House would raise the costs of government were
unreasonable.

Laurance claimed that since the difference

between his proposal of one representative for every thirty
thousand inhabitants and Sedgwick's proposed ratio of one
Congressman for each thirty-four thousand individuals was
only twelve representatives, the resulting increase in the
costs to the government was minimal.

Additionally, any

attempt at limiting the number of representatives in the
4 I b i d . , 3:

154.
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House was detrimental to the people's trust in the Congress:
"The Government is a Government by representation, and it is
of the last importance that the confidence of the people
should be inspired by the feeling that their interests are
fully represented"5 (see table 2).

Table 2
Representatives.Apportioned under Each
Proposed Representation Ratio6
State
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut

New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware

Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

Total

1:30
2
4
15
2
7

1:33
2
4
14
2
7

1:34
2
4
13
2
6

1:35
2
4
13
1
6

1:40
2
3
11
1
5

30

29

27

26

22

11
5
14
1

10
5
13
1

9
5
12
1

9
5
12
1

8
4
10
1

31

29

27

27

23

9
21
2
11
6
2

8
19
2
10
6
2

8
18
2
10
6
2

7
18
1
10
5
2

6
15
1
8
5
1

51

47

46

43

36

112

105

100

96

81

■* -----------

Note: Ratios are one representative for each tens of
thousands.
5Annals of Congress, 3: 154-55
6Author's own calculations based on the population
figures in the Census of 1790.
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After a one week reprieve from debate, the House, on 10
November, again considered the representation ratio.
Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts spoke in favor of one
representative for each thirty-thousand persons.

Although

he failed to sign the Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787,
he argued that the people's wishes as expressed in the
Constitution must be observed.
Gerry reminded the Committee of the Whole that the
government was a government of representation.

Since the

people had a direct say in the selection of neither the
President nor the Senate, the House was their sole voice in
the national government.

He feared that if the number of

representatives were to remain small, the common man would
want for advocates in the federal government.

The American

people, with the ratification of the Constitution, expected
a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand.

He asked

the members of the House if it would not therefore be
perceived as an abuse of their position to increase the
representation ratio and thereby limit the size of future
Congresses.
Gerry contended that the cost of additional
representatives was negligible.

In his estimation, adding

forty-seven members to the House would have increased its
expenditures by only one-eighteenth.

But, he also noted

that he preferred to leave the issue unsettled.

Since by

October 1791 only seven states had ratified the
apportionment amendment, the Congress should let the issue

65

stand.

He suggested waiting until the number of

representatives reached one hundred under the Constitution's
provisions.

The Congress at that time could then alter the

ratio better to match the political opinion of the day.7
Elias Boudinot of New Jersey took issue with Gerry's
arguments for a ratio of one representatives for every
thirty thousand persons.

He argued that even if the House's

operating costs would only increase by one-eighteenth as
Gerry suggested, that one-eighteenth rise was too much.

He

noted that although he was willing to tax the American
people, he was unwilling to burden them with unnecessary
expenses.

Coupled with the fact that only seven states had

adopted the proposed first amendment and two different
representation ratios had been proposed to the Congress, the
House should consider a compromise ratio of one
representative for every thirty-five thousand persons.8
John Steele of North Carolina, speaking against his
fellow Southerners, and Abraham Clark of New Jersey
presented similar arguments against Laurance's resolution.
Clark noted that his opposition was not based solely on
7Ibid., 3: 168-69. By 10 November only New Jersey,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island had ratified the apportionment amendment. The
next day, Virginia became the eight state to ratify. Ibid.,
1: 1983-90.
8Ibid., 169-170. Boudinot presented apportionment
figures based on his own calculations. By those
calculations, a ratio of one to thirty-three thousand would
lead to 113 representatives. A ratio of one to forty
thousand would lead to 81 representatives.
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finances; he feared that as the number of representatives
increased, so would nepotism within the government.

Steele

argued that a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand
would almost double the number of Congressmen in the House,
thus dividing and diminishing the effectiveness of the
House.

He stated: "Too numerous an Assembly is perpetually

liable to disorder; and when that is the case Government
becomes contemptible."9
Laurance countered that any increase in expenditures
resulting from an increase in the number of representatives
was insignificant.

Since "the existence of the Union may

depend on the fulness of representation," the additional
expenses would be negated by the positive gains of a larger
representation.10
Abraham Baldwin of Georgia defended Laurance's
resolution.

He argued that representation in the national

legislature should be based on the size of the United
States.

He contended that while a representation ratio of

one representative for every thirty-four thousand or thirtyfive thousand persons could work in England or France, a
similar ratio was impractical in the United States.

The

size of the United States dictated that more representatives
were needed than in either England or France.

If

republicanism were to succeed in an area as large as the
9 Ibid., 3: 170-71.
10Ibid., 3: 172.
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United States, the representation ratio needed to guarantee
as many representatives in the House as possible.11
On 14 November the House again debated the
apportionment issue.

The guestion of the people's stake in

government remained the central issue.

William Findley of

Pennsylvania noted that
a large representation embraces these interests more
fully, and is more competent to giving and receiving
information. The objects of legislation are such as
come home to the doors, to the feeling of very man; the
Government ought therefore to secure the confidence of
the people by a large representation.12
William Giles of Virginia supported Findley's statements and
argued that since the American people were familiar with the
ratio of one representative for each thirty thousand
persons, any change in that ratio would be perceived as
corruption on the part of the Congress.12
The next day the representation question was again the
central topic of debate in the Committee of the Whole.

John

Page of Virginia noted, like Gerry, that it would be best if
the representation issue were settled by a later Congress
where the implications of the debate would be more
significantly felt.

But he also stated, "it is not and

cannot be the interest or the wish of the people at large to

1:LIbid., 3: 173-75.
12 Ibid., 3: 177.
12Ibid., 3: 178-79.
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have a small representation in the Congress under the
present Government.
Abraham Clark felt differently.

He was convinced that

a larger representative body would lead to corruption.

In

response to one of Findley's earlier statements that more
wisdom would be brought into the House by increasing the
ratio, Clark asked whether that increase would not instead
bring folly.

Lacking confidence in the polity to make the

"virtuous" decisions in the election of their leaders, Clark
argued,
If ever the liberties of the People are endangered, it
will not be by the smallness of the representation, but
by the corruption of electors and elections. This is
the door which Congress should guard in the strictest
manner, and that will secure the people against
corruption in the House.1
15*
4
With Clark's objections aside, Laurance's resolution
was put to a vote of the Committee of the Whole.

It passed

by a margin of thirty-five in favor and twenty-three
opposed.

The chairman then ordered that John Page, William

Vans Murray of Maryland, and Nathaniel Macon of North
Carolina prepare an apportionment bill based on Laurance's
resolution for submittal to the House.15

On 21 November,

14Ibid., 3: 181-82.
15Ibid., 3: 185.
15The Journal of the House of Representatives
(Philadelphia: Francis Childs and John Swaine, 1792;
reprint, 9 vols., Martin P. Claussen, ed.,Wilmington Del.:
Michael Glazier, Inc., 1977), 4: 30-31 (page reference are
to reprint; hereinafter cited as House Journal). For a
complete description of the measure and vote, see Appendix
1, roll call 1.
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Page's committee reported its bill to the Committee of the
Whole.

As instructed, it stated that after 3 March 1793,

therefore in the Third Congress, representation would be
apportioned among the states at a ratio of one
representative for each thirty thousand persons.I7
After a failed attempt on 23 November to change the
bill to reflect a representation ratio of one to thirty-four
thousand, the House, on 24 November, took its roll call on
the apportionment committee's bill.

By a vote of forty-

three in favor and twelve opposed, the House passed its
first apportionment bill.1** Unfortunately for the
supporters of that bill, the Senate, on 8 December, returned
it to the House.

But before doing so, the Senate voted on

the same day to amend the House bill to include a
representation ratio of one to thirty-three thousand. ^
Findley, on 12 December, dubiously contended that the
apportionment provisions in the Senate bill were
unconstitutional.

He stated: "The Constitution of the

United States is express in the subject, and now is the time1
9
*
7

17Ibid., 4: 35.
■'■®Ibid., 4: 37. See Appendix 1, roll call 2.
19Ibid., 40-41. See Appendix 1, roll call 3; The
Journal of the Senate Including the Journal of the Executive
Proceedings of the Senate (Philadelphia: John Fenno, 1792;
reprint, 9 vols., Martin P. Claussen, ed., Wilmington, Del.:
Michael Glazier, Inc., 1977), 4: 55-56 (page references are
to reprint; hereinafter cited as Senate Journal).
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when the people ought to enjoy the advantages of the
representation of one to each thirty thousand."20
Two days later the House considered whether to agree to
the Senate's amendments to the apportionment bill.

But

before that vote could be taken, John Vining of Delaware
submitted an amendment to the bill dictating each state's
number of representatives in the House.

Almost identical to

a later bill proposed by the Senate on 12 March 1792, it
mentioned neither a representation ratio nor a later
apportionment.

After Vining's amendment failed, a roll call

was taken on whether to incorporate the Senate's
apportionment ratio of one to thirty-three thousand.

By a

narrow margin of only two votes, the House voted not to
agree to the Senate's amended apportionment bill.21
The next day the Senate debated the apportionment
issue.

By a vote of thirteen to twelve, with the Vice-

President casting the deciding vote, the Senate voted not to
recede from its amendment calling for an apportionment ratio
of one to thirty-three thousand.

Additionally, the Senate

failed to agree that a compromise committee comprised of
members from both houses was needed to discuss the issue.22
2°Annals of Congress, 3: 243-45. The Constitution's
apportionment provisions stated not more than one
representative for every thirty thousand, not one
representative for every thirty thousand, a significant
difference.
2lHouse Journal, 4: 54-55; See Appendix 1, roll calls
4-5.
22senate Journal. 4: 60-61.
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Four days later the apportionment bill was back in the
House of Representatives.

Two roll calls were taken on

whether to agree to the Senate's apportionment ratio of one
representatives for each thirty-three thousand persons.
Both votes failed.

The next day, 20 December 1791, the

first apportionment bill died when the Senate again voted
not to recede from its insistence on its ratio of one
representatives for each thirty-three thousand persons.2^
Through the first three weeks of January 1972 the House
considered business other than the apportionment issue.
Then on 24 January it resumed its debate on the
representation ratio.

On the same day, the Committee of the

Whole was presented with a new apportionment resolution.
The wording in the resolution, with two very significant
exceptions, was similar to the bill rejected by the Senate
on 20 December 1791.

The first exception stated that a

reapportionment would take place after 3 March 1797 and the
convening of the Fifth Congress instead of 3 March 1793 and
the Third Congress.

Additionally, it read, "and no greater

ratio be reported, than thirty thousand inhabitants for
every representative."*
24
Northerners immediately attacked the apportionment
resolution.

Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey unsuccessfully

moved to strike out the section of the resolution calling
^House Journal, 4: 58-60. See Appendix 1, roll calls
6-7; Senate Journal, 4: 64.
24House Journal, 4: 83.
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for a second enumeration.

Dayton hoped to keep the

population figures used in the apportionment of
representatives static and to deny the South the increase in
representatives as its population expanded into its western
frontier.252
6
Livermore, on the heels of Dayton's motion, offered
another amendment to the resolution.

He argued that since

the Senate had previously rejected the ratio of one
representative for each thirty thousand persons, the House,
in the interests of compromise, should prevent it from being
reported by striking out the section of the resolution
prohibiting a ratio greater than one representative for
thirty thousand persons from being reported. 25
Livermore contended that a representation ratio of one
representative for every thirty thousand persons would cause
too many Americans to be unrepresented.27

For example, if

one were to take New Hampshire's population of 141,822 and
apply a representation ratio of one representative for every
thirty thousand inhabitants, New Hampshire would be allotted
four representatives.

But, those four representatives

actually would represent only 120,000 of New Hampshire's
inhabitants.

Therefore, New Hampshire would have nearly

twenty-two thousand persons, the difference between 141,888
2^Ibid., 4: 83-84.

See Appendix 1, roll call 8.

26Ibid., 4: 84.
27Annals of Congress, 3: 332.
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and 120,000, without representation.

But at a ratio of one

representative for every thirty-three thousand inhabitants,
the number of New Hampshire's inhabitants without
representation declined to less than ten thousand.

Under a

ratio of one to thirty thousand, Virginia would have a mere
559 inhabitants without representation, while Maryland would
have less than nine thousand persons without representation.
In fact, the most advantageous representation ratio for
Maryland and Virginia was one to thirty thousand.

However,

at the same ratio, all the New England states, with the
exception of Rhode Island, had at least six thousand, and up
to twenty-one thousand, individuals without representation
as compared to a ratio of one to thirty-three thousand (see
table 3).
Although Livermore's argument disregarded the non
representation of the remaining two-fifths of the nation's
slave population, it was convincing enough to the members of
the Committee of the Whole to accept the amendment.28
Egbert Benson of New York, James Madison of Virginia,
and Gerry were then instructed to prepare an apportionment
bill based on the House's amended resolution.

On 13

February the committee presented its resolution to the
Committee of the Whole.

Numbered H.R. 163, it contained no

mention of a representation ratio.

It did, however, contain

provisions for a second enumeration and a subsequent2
8
28House Journal, 4: 84-85.
9.

See Appendix 1, roll call

reapportionment of representatives after 3 March 1797— the
beginning of the Fifth Congress.29

Table 3
Number of Persons Unrepresented under Each
Proposed Representation Ratio303
1
State
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut

1: 30
25,533
21,822
25,327
8,446
26,840

1: 33
19,533
9,822
13,327
2,446
5,840

1: 34
7,533
5,822
33,327
446
32,840

1: 35
15,533
1,822
20,327
33,446
26,840

1:40
5,533
21,822
35,327
28,446
36,840

New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware

1,590
29,570
12,878
25,541

1,590
14,570
3,878
22,541

25,590
9,570
24,878
21,541

16,590
4,570
12,878
20,541

11,590
19,570
32,878
15,541

Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

8,514
559
8,705
28,522
26,235
10,842

14,514
3,559
2,705
23,522
8,235
4,842

6,514
18,559
705
13,522
2,235
2,842

33,514
559
33,705
3,522
31,235
842

38,514
30,559
28,705
33,522
6,235
30,842

Joshua Seney of Maryland argued that a representation
ratio of one to thirty thousand should be added to H.R. 163.
His fellow representative from Maryland, John Mercer, called
for as small a ratio as possible.

Mercer contended that a

small number of representatives could not rule properly and
the eventual result of a limited membership in the House
would be despotism.33
29Ibid., 4: 97.
30Author's own calculations.
thousands.

Ratios are in tens of

31Annals of Congress. 3: 403-05.
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On 20 February Seney's proposal was incorporated into
H.R. 163.

But before that, two roll calls were taken on the

provisions in H.R. 163 calling for a second enumeration.
The implications of those roll calls were significant.

If

the amendments had passed, reapportionment would be based
solely on population figures in the Census of 1790.

While

that census favored the Southern states in 1790, New
Englanders could be sure that a later census would favor the
same states even more.

Certainly the South, with larger

back-countries open to settlement vis-a-vis New England,
would experience a significant population increase.

Among

the Southern states, only Maryland, with a fixed western
boundary, could not expect a massive population growth on
the western frontier.

Therefore, if a reapportionment were

to be made following a second census, New England could
expect to lose even more representative strength in the
House.

But since those amendments failed, the apportionment

of representatives would reflect future changes in the
distribution of population throughout the country.32
The next day, 21 February, the House took its vote on
H.R. 163.

By a margin of eighteen votes, the Committee of

the Whole found all the provisions of H.R. 163 acceptable.
The House apportionment bill thereafter incorporated all the
points of the earlier debate.

It included provisions for

making a apportionment based on the Census of 1790 at a
32House Journal, 4: 104-07.
10- 1 2 .

See Appendix 1, roll calls
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representation ratio of one representative for every thirty
thousand persons.

It additionally directed a second

enumeration on which to base the apportionment of
representatives to compose the House after the Fifth
Congress.33
On 6 March, H.R. 163 was read for a second time in the
Senate.

As the first order of business the Senate

considered an amendment delaying the reapportionment date
until 3 March 1803— the Eight House.

Although that

amendment failed, the Senate, through another amendment,
succeeded in establishing 3 March 1793, the start of the
Third House, as the apportionment date.34
But even more drastic changes were made to H.R. 163 on
12 March.

The Senate amended the bill to read that after 3

March 1793 the House of Representatives would be comprised
of one hundred and twenty members.

New Hampshire would

receive five representatives, Massachusetts sixteen, Vermont
three, Rhode Island two, Connecticut eight, New York eleven,
New Jersey six, Pennsylvania fourteen, Delaware two,
Maryland nine, Virginia twenty-one, Kentucky two, North
Carolina twelve, South Carolina seven, and Georgia two.
Although a representation ratio of one to thirty thousand
was proposed for the bill, it failed to garner enough
support to pass.

As a result, the Senate version of the

3
3
ibid.,

4: 108-09.

See Appendix 1, roll call 13.

3
4
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Journal. 4: 145-47.
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apportionment bill contained no mention of any
representation ratio on which to base future
reapportionments.33
The Senate bill offered little to the Southern states
(see table 4).

Only North and South Carolina could
Table 4

Representatives Apportioned under the
Constitution, H.R. 147, and the Senate Bill36
State
Constitution
Vermont
0
New Hampshire
3
Massachusetts
8
Rhode Island
1
Connecticut
5

New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware

Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

Total

H.R. 147
2
4
15
2
7

Senate Bill
3
5
16
2
8

17

30

34

6
4
8
1

11
5
14
1

11
6
14
2

19

31

33

6
10
0
5
5
3

9
21
2
11
6
2

9
21
2
12
7
2

29

51

53

65

112

120

expect to gain additional representatives under the Senate
bill as compared to their apportionment at a ratio of one to3
*
5
35Ibid., 152-54.
36Author's own calculations.
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thirty thousand.

New York's and Pennsylvania's

apportionments remained the same.

But the New England

states would receive an additional four representatives.
Vermont, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts would
each earn an additional representative when compared to
their apportionment at a ratio of one to thirty thousand.
The House considered the Senate's finalized bill under
the name H.R. 179.

The Committee of the Whole, on 17 March,

failed to agree to the Senate bill dictating the number of
representatives at one hundred-twenty.

But realizing the

implications of its vote, it agreed to establish a
conference committee comprised of members from each house to
confer on the apportionment issue.

Two days later the

Senate concurred that a conference committee was in order.37
The House's committee representatives, Madison,
Findley, James Hillhouse of Connecticut, William C. Smith of
South Carolina, and Baldwin met with Oliver Ellsworth, Aaron
Burr, and Pierce Butler through 22 March.

On that day,

Ellsworth reported to the Senate that the committee had been
unable to reach an agreement on the apportionment issue.
The Senate then voted in favor of insisting on all its
amendments to H.R. 179.3
38
7
37House Journal, 4: 137-38. See Appendix 1, roll call
14 .
38Annals of Congress, 3: 474, 109; Senate Journal, 4:
162-63. Madison had remained silent on the representation
debate in the Second Congress until his selection to the
committee.
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On 23 March a breakthrough was made in the
apportionment debate.

By a margin of only two votes, the

House of Representatives agreed to recede from all its
disagreements to H.R. 179.

With that vote, the Congress had

finally reached a consensus on the apportionment issue.

All

that was required to make the bill law was President George
Washington's signature.39*
However, Washington refused to sign the Congress's
apportionment bill.

After conferring with his cabinet, on 5

April he returned the bill to the House of Representatives
with its first veto message.
objections to the bill.

In that message he stated two

First, there was "no one proportion

or divisor, which, applied to the respective numbers of the
states, will yield the number and allotment of
representatives proposed by the bill."40
Six different representation ratios were used in the
bill.

Delaware's ratio was one to twenty-seven thousand

thus assuring it of at least two members in the House.

New

Hampshire's and Vermont's representatives were apportioned
at a ratio of one to twenty-eight thousand.

The

representatives of three Northern states, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, and New Jersey, and two Southern states, North
Carolina and South Carolina, were apportioned at the ratio
39House Journal, 4: 146-47, See Appendix 1, roll call
15.
4^Harold C. Syrett, ed., The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton. 27 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press,
1961-87), 11: 226-30; House Journal, 4: 168.
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of one representative for each twenty-nine thousand persons.
The largest remaining states, whose populations assured them
of a significant number of representatives in the House, New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, had their
representatives apportioned at a ratio of one to thirty
thousand.

Rhode Island and Kentucky, two states with

virtually the same population, had ratios of one to thirtyfour thousand.

Georgia's representatives were figured at a

ratio of one to thirty-five thousand.41
Washington's second objection was that the Constitution
provided for a representation ratio no greater than one
representative for each thirty thousand persons.42

As noted

above, the Congress's apportionment figures were in direct
violation of the Constitution's restrictions on
apportionment ratios.

He wrote that as the bill stood,

eight states were allotted representatives at a ratio of
more than one representative for every thirty thousand
inhabitants.
Eight states were indeed apportioned representatives at
a ratio of greater than one to each thirty thousand.
Therefore, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, and South

41Each state's representation ratio was determined by
dividing the state’s population by the number of
representatives apportioned to it. Author's own
calculations.
42House Journal, 4: 168.
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Carolina were all allotted representation at a ratio
prohibited by the Constitution (see table 5).
Table 5
Representation Ratios in H.R. 17943
State
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut

Representatives
under H.R. 179
3
5
16
2
8

Population
85,533
141,822
475,327
68,446
236,840

Representation
Ratio
1:28,000
1:28,000
1:29,000
1: 34,000
1:29,000

New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware

11
6
14
2

331,590
179,570
432,878
55,541

1:30,000
1:29,000
1:30,000
1:27,000

Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

9
21
2
12
7
2

278,514
630,559
68,705
353,522
206,235
70,842

1:30,000
1:30,000
1:34,000
1:29,000
1:29,000
1:35,000

On 6 April the House attempted to override the
President's veto of H.R. 179.

By a vote of twenty-eight in

favor and thirty-three opposed the House failed to muster
the two-thirds majority required by the Constitution to pass
H.R. 179 over Washington's veto.

The next day, a committee

comprised of Laurance, the individual who started the
apportionment debate with his resolution calling for a
representation ratio of one to thirty thousand, Seney, and

43Author's own calculations.
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Jeremiah Smith of New Hampshire was formed to devise a new
apportionment bill.444
5
Laurance's committee reported its revised version of
H.R. 179 to the House on 9 April.

Instead of dictating the

representation ratio to the House, the committee left that
portion of the bill blank.

With virtually no debate, a roll

call was taken of the House to insert in the blank the ratio
of one representative for each thirty-three thousand
persons.

By a vote of thirty-four in favor, thirty opposed,

that ratio was engrossed into H.R. 179.

With no more

objection to the apportionment bill in the House, it was
sent to the Senate for its concurrence.4^
The next day, 10 April, H.R. 179 passed the Senate
without any amendments.

When President Washington signed it

into law on 14 April as "An Act for apportioning
Representatives among the several states according to the
First Enumeration,"4^ the apportionment debate in the Second
Congress ended.

44House Journal, 4: 170-71.

See Appendix 1, roll call

16.
45Ibid., 4: 175-76.

See Appendix 1, roll call 17.

4®Senate Journal, 4: 178; Annals of Congress. 3, 1359.

CHAPTER 6

ANALYSIS OF THE ROLL CALL RECORD
Two basic assumptions must be made with cluster bloc
analysis.1

The first is that representatives will vote as

they believe.

In other words, a representative's vote on a

particular issue indicates that representative's true
position on the issue--with occasional exceptions made for
political maneuvering and expediency.

The second basic

assumption is that representatives who vote together will
have some common feature and can therefore be grouped into
voting blocs that give some meaningful indicator of causal
factors.

Such blocs may indicate degrees of sectional or

party unity or disunity, coalitions between and within
sections and parties, factionalism within regions or
parties, or any number of other combinations.
In cluster bloc analysis, the absence of voting is as
important as voting itself.

For example, if a Northern

lMy discussion of the techniques involved in Rice-Byele
Cluster Bloc Analysis is taken from Lee F. Anderson,
Meredith W. Watts, Jr., and Allen R. Wilcox, Legislative
Roll Call Analysis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,
1966), 56-74; Richard Beringer, Historical Analysis:
Contemporary Approaches to Clio's Craft (New York: John
Wiley & Sons, 1978), 287-93; Charles M. Dollar and Richard
J. Jensen, Historian's Guide to Statistics: Quantitative
Analysis in Historical Research (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, Inc., 1971), 106-109, 214-23; David B. Truman,
The Congressional Party: A Case Study (New York: John Wiley
& Sons, 1959), 45-48.
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representative were not to vote for a specific piece of
legislation that other members of his section supported,
that representative's absence is significant.

By not

voting, that representative's actions could be perceived as
a protest against that specific piece of legislation, his
party, his coalition within the party, or perhaps his
section.

On the other hand, lack of a vote may indicate an

attempt to dodge an issue, or that the legislator was ill,
away from the capital, or away from his seat for reasons
that have nothing to do with politics.

If several

representatives fail to vote either yea or nay on an issue
or a set of related issues, however, those representatives
may be placed in their own bloc.
Cluster bloc analysis also provides the researcher with
a tool to determine the opinions of the many representatives
who failed to speak in regular session, the Committee of the
Whole, or in Committee.

If a representative casts a vote,

or in certain instances does not, that representative is
expressing an opinion on an issue.

Since most

representatives do not actually speak on the floor of the
House of Representatives, the researcher can garner what
that representative's opinion may have been.

If historians

fail to examine the legislative voting record, they will
study the elite and garrulous only, and it is more than
likely that they could ignore the contribution of the
majority of representatives.
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Rice-Beyle Cluster-Bloc Analysis, the type of
legislative roll call analysis utilized here, involves a
standard set of procedures.

The first step in cluster bloc

analysis is the selection of roll calls to be analyzed.

For

this paper, seventeen roll calls from the First Session,
Second House of Representatives were selected.

Each of

these roll calls dealt specifically with the apportionment
of representation in the House of Representation.

Appendix

1 contains a complete listing of these roll calls, as well
as a description of the measure, issue, vote, result, and
probable attitudinal position a Congressman would hold
regarding that roll call.

Appendix 2 contains a listing of

each section's vote on the apportionment roll calls.2
The second step in cluster bloc analysis involves
calculating the extent of agreement between representatives.
A cluster bloc computer program provides an index of
agreement for each possible pair of representatives.3

This

simple measure of agreement is the percentage of times that
two representatives voted the same way on the chosen set of
roll calls.

The pair-wise indexes of agreement are then

2When selecting roll calls to be analyzed, it is
important to cross-check the information presented in the
Voting Records with the actual debates in the Annals of
Congress and the Journal of the House of Representatives, as
discrepancies in the Voting Records are often present.
3The computer program utilized in this paper is found
in Cluster Bloc Analysis, unpublished computer program by
Jarvis Ehart and Richard Beringer, University of North
Dakota, 1972. The Ehart and Beringer program is a
modification of the cluster bloc program found in Anderson,
Watts, and Wilcox, Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, chapter
4.
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placed in a matrix like the one in Appendix 4.

Blocs are

formed among the representatives with the highest levels of
agreement.

Those with the highest level of agreement are

placed at the top of the matrix, while those with lower
levels of agreement are placed progressively lower in the
matrix.

For example, Abraham Baldwin of Georgia voted for

each measure that would have increased the size of the House
of Representatives.4

To fall into the same bloc as Baldwin,

a representative would have to have voted in agreement with
Baldwin on at least 70 percent of the twelve selected roll
calls.

This is an arbitrary threshold, and may vary from

study to study, but it has been proven to be compatible with
the data in this study.

Requiring a threshold that is too

high tends to lead to the conclusion that there were no
blocs at all, much as high water levels do not reveal the
rocks and reefs.

Criteria that are too low would mislead

the reader into believing that there was relatively little
disagreement among Congressmen--there would be nothing but
rocks and reefs.

The conventional threshold in this sort of

research is between 70 percent and 80 percent.

Given the

rudimentary nature of factional development in the early
1790s, we are justified in using the lower conventional
criteria.
4For the roll call data pertaining to the Second House,
refer to the Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research, United States Congressional Roll Call
Voting Records, 2 House, 1791-1793, machine readable
records, ICPSR 0004 (hereinafter cited as Voting Records).
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Rarely will all representatives fall into the same
bloc.

This would indicate there was no disagreement in the

legislative body, but members will argue.

Moreover, if a

representative agrees with at least 50 percent of the bloc
members, but not all of them, that representative is
considered a "fringe" member.

Those representatives who are

neither bloc nor fringe members, but who agree with at least
one other representative at least 70 percent of the time are
"isolates."

If the index of agreement between two

representatives is less than 70 percent, a zero is
substituted in the matrix for the index of agreement.

That

zero does not imply that there was no agreement between the
two representatives.

Instead, it simply signifies that the

level of frequency of agreement between them failed to break
the minimum threshold of 70 percent and therefore one or
both is not to be considered a bloc or fringe member for our
purposes.
Cluster bloc analysis of the apportionment roll calls
in the Second Congress indicates a great deal about
sectionalism's role in the apportionment debate.

The entire

membership of the First Session of the Second House was
analyzed and three sectional blocs were found: a Southern
bloc, a New England bloc, and a Mid-Atlantic bloc.

There

are two possible conclusions that can be drawn from that
analysis.

First, Southern representatives united against

representatives from the North (New England and Mid-Atlantic
states) to support an increase in the size of the House of
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Representatives.

And within the North, there was a distinct

division between the New England states and the Mid-Atlantic
states.

The second, and less explanatory conclusion, is

that the apportionment debate saw an East-West sectionalism.
This theory would suggest that the states without a large
western frontier (Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island,
Vermont, New Hampshire, Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland)
opposed the states with a large frontier (Virginia, North
Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia).

The states with the

large western frontiers could look forward to the day when
increased settlement would automatically increase their
representation.

The other states would not have that

expectation.
Under the Constitution's apportionment clause, the five
Southern states, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Georgia, had a total of twenty-nine
representatives between them.

Table 6 shows that 52 percent

Table 6
Distribution of Southern
Representatives in Southern Bloc and Fringe
(Percents calculated by rows)
State
Maryland
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia
Total

Number of
Members
6
10
5
5
3
29

Bloc
Members
1 (17%)
9 (90%)
1 (20%)
2 (40%)
2 (67%)

Fringe
Members
3 (50%)
1 (10%)
3 (60%)
1 (20%)
1 (33%)

Total of
Bloc/Fringe
4 (67%)

15 (52%)

9 (31%)

24 (83%)

10

( 1 0 0 %)

4
3
3

(80%)
(60%)
(100%)
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of Southern representatives in the House voted in a single
bloc, while 31 percent of them were on the fringe of that
bloc.

Out of a total of twenty-nine representatives, 83

percent voted with their section on the seventeen
apportionment roll calls held in the Second Congress.
The matrixes of the Southern, New England, and Mid-Atlantic
blocs and fringes can be found in Appendix 4.
It is possible to account for the five Southern
representatives who were not in the Southern bloc or fringe.
For example, John Mercer of Maryland failed to vote on the
minimum twelve roll calls to be eligible for membership.in
the matrix.

While I mentioned earlier that absence from

voting is in itself a voting behavior, Mercer's absences
cannot be attributed to his opposition to the rest of his
section.

Mercer took his seat in the House on 6 February

1792 to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of his
predecessor, William Pinkney.

Pinkney had resigned in

November 1791 over questions surrounding his residence and
eligibility to serve as a representative from Maryland.
Mercer was not present for the first fifteen roll calls cast
in the Second House.

He was, however, present for four of

the apportionment roll calls.

On those four occasions, he

voted with his Southern colleagues each time.5

5lbid.; Congress, Senate, Biographical Directory of the
United States Congress 1774-1989. 100th Cong., 1st sess.,
1989. S. Doc. 100-34, 53 (hereinafter cited as Biographical
Directory).
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Upton Sheridine, also of Maryland, was also not in the
Southern bloc or fringe.

But Sheridine voted on only 21 of

the 102 roll calls in the entire Second House.

Absence on

79 percent of the roll calls for a particular Congress does
not justify considering those absences as significant
behavior for roll call analysis.

However, of the twenty-one

votes that Sheridine did cast, seven were on apportionment
roll calls.

Of those seven votes, Sheridine voted with the

Southern bloc members on six times, suggesting that he was
leaning heavily toward support of the Southern position.6
Additionally, the fact that one-third of the roll calls that
he actively participated in were over the apportionment
issue suggests the importance of that debate for his
section.
Two representatives from South Carolina failed to vote
in either the Southern bloc or fringe.

The first case,

William L. Smith, is a useful example of an isolate.

Smith

voted at least 70 percent agreement with five Southern bloc
or fringe members: John Ashe of North Carolina at 79
percent, Samuel Sterett of Maryland at 75 percent, Nathaniel
Macon of North Carolina at 73 percent, and William Barry
Grove of North Carolina and Daniel Huger of South Carolina
at 71 percent.

As such, Smith cannot be completely ruled

out as a supporter of the Southern position.

6Votinq Records.
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Robert Barnwell was the second of South Carolina's
representatives who failed to appear in the Southern bloc or
fringe.

However, he was an isolate with both William L.

Smith of South Carolina and Philip Key of Maryland.

Of the

seventeen roll calls examined, Barnwell sided with the South
nine times and with the New England bloc eight times.

It

appears as if his political loyalties on the apportionment
issue were divided.

One can only suppose that perhaps

Barnwell opposed any large increase in the number of
representatives on political or social ground.

Perhaps more

analysis of Barnwell's writings would hold the answer to his
position on the representation issue.
An additional Southern representative failed to appear
in the Southern bloc or fringe.

John Steele of North

Carolina cast only twelve votes on the apportionment roll
calls.

However, Steele actively participated in the

majority of the remaining roll calls in the Second House.
On the twelve apportionemnt roll calls that Steele voted on,
he was in agreement with his fellow Southerners only five
times.

But on those same twelve roll calls, he voted with

the New England bloc six times.

While at first perplexing,

Steele's behavior makes more sense when the debates in the
House are examined.

Steele was one of the most vocal

critics of a dramatic increase in the number of
representatives, and stated as much on 10 November 1791 on
the floor of the House.

Additionally, biographical data on

Steele suggest that he was a supporter of the Federalist
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Party later in his career.7

Perhaps Steele chose to abstain

from a number of votes that he felt would put him in
opposition to his Southern colleagues.

However, the votes

he did cast pushed his membership toward the New England
bloc.
But even with the failure of Steele and Barnwell to
vote with the Southern bloc and fringe, 83 percent of
Southern representatives in the Second Congress favored
increasing the size of the House of Representatives.

After

we consider that two of the five Southern representatives
not in the Southern bloc or fringe can be accounted for by
not being present in the House at the time of the debate,
the percentage of Southerners in the single bloc and fringe
increases to 89 percent.
A similar analysis of the voting patterns of the
representatives from New England shows a discernible bloc
diametrically opposed to the Southern bloc and fringe.

For

example, Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire voted exactly
opposite to Abraham Baldwin on every representation roll
call.

I noted earlier that Baldwin was one of the South's

most ardent supporters of an increase in the size of the
House.

Therefore, Gilman's votes can be used as a standard

by which to judge New England's opposition to an increase in
the size of the House.8

An analysis of the roll calls

7Bioqraphical Directory, 1865.
8Votinq Records.
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indicates that the majority of New England's representatives
agreed with Gilman.

A total of 58 percent of New England's

representatives voted in the same bloc as Gilman.

Likewise,

21 percent of the representatives from New England were on
the fringe of that bloc.

Thus, as table 7 reveals, a

Table 7
Distribution of New England
Representatives in New England Bloc and Fringe
(Percents calculated by rows)
State
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Rhode Island
Total

Number of
Members
2
3
8
5
1

Bloc
Members
2 (100%)
3 (100%)
4 (50%)
1 (20%)
1 (100%)

Fringe
Members

19

11 (58%)

4 (21%)

-

2 (25%)
2 (40%)

Total of
Bloc/Frinae
2 (100%)
3 (100%)
6 (75%)
3 (60%)
1 (100%)
15 (79%)

substantial total of 79 percent of the representatives from
New England were part of either a bloc or a fringe with the
other members of that section.
But not all of the representatives from New England
fell into the New England bloc and fringe.

However, like

most of the Southern representatives who were not part of
the Southern bloc and fringe, the absence of similar
representatives from New England can be explained.

For

example, George Leonard of Massachusetts was not even
present in the House during the apportionment debate;
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Leonard did not take his seat until after the debate had
ended.9
Jonathan Trumball of Connecticut did not actively
participate in the apportionment debate in the whole Second
House.

In fact, of the 102 roll calls held during the

Second Congress, Trumbull voted yea or nay only 5 times.

Of

those five votes, only one was cast in the first session and
that vote had nothing to do with the apportionment debate.10
But Trumball was Speaker of the House, and the Speaker
rarely voted unless to make a special point or to break a
tie.
James Hillhouse of Connecticut was a semi-active member
of the House during the representation debate.

But he

failed to vote with his fellow representatives from New
England.

However, he did vote as an isolate with Robert

Barnwell of South Carolina and Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania.
The only representative from New England who voted
consistently against his section was Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusetts.

One will recall that as early as the

Constitutional Convention Gerry had favored an increase in
the size of the House of Representatives.

Yet, he failed to

side completely with the South on the apportionment issue in
the Second Congress.

Of the seventeen roll calls analyzed,

Gerry cast votes on only twelve.11
9 Ibid.
lOlbid.

1 1 Ibid.

It is likely that rather

95

than alienate the members of his section, Gerry abstained
from casting votes against their position.

On the twelve

roll calls he voted on, he managed to agree with his fellow
New Englanders seven times, thus denying him a place in the
New England bloc or fringe.

Thus, if we remove Leonard and

Trumbull from our calculations as inactive voters, the
percentage of representatives from New England voting in a
single bloc and fringe increases 10 percent to 89 percent.
Gerry was not the only Northern representative who
abstained from voting on a significant number of roll calls.
Several representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states (New
Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Delaware) abstained from
voting on several of the apportionment roll calls that so
clearly divided the South from New England.12

The same

analysis that was used to determine the New England and
Southern blocs and fringes shows that representatives from
the Mid-Atlantic states also voted in a discernible bloc and
fringe, distinct from the Southern and New England Blocs.
Table 8 shows that six of the nineteen members (32 percent)
from the Mid-Atlantic states voted in the same bloc.

Two

(11 percent) of the representatives from the same states
were on the fringe of that bloc.

12lbid.

96

Table 8
Distribution of Mid-Atlantic Representatives
in Mid-Atlantic Bloc and Fringe
(Percents calculated by rows)

State
New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Delaware
Total

Number of
Members
4
6
8
1

Bloc
Members

19

6 (32%)

-

2 (33%)
4 (50%)
—

Fringe
Members
1 (25%)
1 (17%)
—

Total of
Bloc/Frinae
1 (25%)
3 (50%)
4 (50%)
—

2 (11%)

8 (42%)

The Mid-Atlantic position on the apportionment roll
calls was closer to that of New England's that to that of
the South.

As Appendix 2 shows, on the seventeen

representation roll calls, the Mid-Atlantic states sided
with the New England states ten times.

On four of the roll

calls they voted with the Southern representatives.

But on

the three roll calls dealing with the census, many of the
representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states abstained from
voting.

The representatives from New Jersey and Delaware

could expect little increase in representation in future
Congresses resulting from an increase in their states'
population.
Membership in the Mid-Atlantic and New England blocs
and fringes was not mutually exclusive.

For example, Amasa

Learned of Connecticut was a member of both the Mid-Atlantic
and New England blocs.

Jeremiah Wadsworth, also of

Connecticut was a member of both the New England bloc and
the Mid-Atlantic fringe.

Of the four representatives from
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New Jersey, only one of them, Abraham Clark, was in the MidAtlantic fringe while the remaining representatives from New
Jersey fell into the New England bloc and fringe.

The

significance of that voting breakdown will be discussed
later.
Pennsylvania's representatives failed to unite into a
single Mid-Atlantic bloc.

In fact, two representatives from

Pennsylvania, William Findley, a vocal supporter of an
increase in the size of the House during the debates in the
Committee of the Whole, and Frederick A.C. Muhlenberg,
abandoned their fellow Northerners and voted within the
Southern bloc.
Two other Pennsylvanians appear unaccounted for in the
representation debate.

One, Daniel Heister, voted on only

nine of the seventeen roll calls.

Of those nine roll calls,

six votes were in common with the Southern bloc, five were
in agreement with the Mid-Atlantic bloc, and only three
matched the New England position.13

With such limited

information, Heister's voting record cannot be used to
accurately determine any position other than perhaps
opposition to the New England position.

Andrew Gregg, the

other missing Pennsylvania representative, can be accounted
for as an isolate.

A breakdown of the vote showed that

Hillhouse of Connecticut voted in agreement on enough issues
with Gregg for the two to become isolates.
13lbid.

98

John Vining, Delaware's representative in the House,
failed to vote on enough issues to appear in any of the
blocs.14

But it will be remembered that Vining continually

argued during the debates in the Committee of the Whole for
an increase in at least Delaware's representation in the
House.
New York's representatives, like those of Pennsylvania
and New Jersey, failed to commit to the Mid-Atlantic blocs
en masse.

Of New York's six representatives in the House,

three were members of the Mid-Atlantic bloc or fringe.
Cornelius Schoonmaker, like Vining, failed to vote on enough
roll calls to be a member of any bloc.15

John Laurance, as

expected after all his efforts in the Committee of the Whole
to increase the size of the House, voted with the Southern
bloc.

Meanwhile, Thomas Tredwell's voting pattern put him

very close to the Southern fringe.

Tredwell was an isolate

with seven of the sixteen Southern bloc members.
Undoubtedly, Tredwell's interests were with his Southern
colleagues and not with his fellow representatives from the
North.
While a North-South division on the apportionment issue
appears obvious, we must consider the possibility that the
sectional division over the apportionment debate was between
the East and the West as opposed to the North and the South.
14lbid.
15lbid.
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The East was those states without a large western frontier
into which their populations would expand.

Therefore, we

must consider all of New England, plus Delaware, New Jersey,
and Maryland as Eastern states.

Virginia, North Carolina,

South Carolina, and Georgia, with their large western
frontiers, were the Western states.

New York and

Pennsylvania did not have extensive western boundaries in
the early 1790, but they still had large areas of land
within the states open to settlement.

Therefore, their

interests would lie with a Western bloc.
The Eastern position would oppose any dramatic increase
in the size of the House of Representatives.

Conversely,

the Western states would favor such an increase as they
would certainly benefit from any reapportionments based on
proportional representation.

It logically follows that all

of New England would fall in the Eastern bloc and all of the
South, except Maryland, would fall in the Western bloc.
Moreover, Pennsylvania and New York would vote with the
Western (Southern) bloc.
But analysis of the roll call record reveals that
Maryland abandoned Eastern solidarity to vote with the
Western bloc.

Undoubtedly, the representatives from

Maryland viewed Southern sectional unity as more vital to
their interests than Eastern unity.
The voting behavior of the Mid-Atlantic states also
challenges the contention of a East-West sectional division
on the apportionment issue.

First, we must remember that
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Pennsylvania refused to ratify the apportionment amendment
that would have surely increased its apportionment of
representatives.

Second, why did only three (16 percent) of

New York's and Pennsylvania’s representatives vote with the
Western bloc?

If an East-West division was present, does it

not follow that more than 16 percent of those
representatives would have voted in the Western bloc?

If we

consider that only two (25 percent) of Pennsylvania's
representatives voted with the Western bloc while four (50
percent) voted against that bloc and with the Mid-Atlantic
bloc, we see that the sectional orientation of
Pennsylvanians was definitely more North-South than EastWest.

Moreover, three (50 percent) of New York's

representatives voted against the Western bloc and for the
Mid-Atlantic bloc (see table 9).
New Jersey's voting behavior just as likely suggests a
North-South division as it suggests an East-West
sectionalism.

Regarding the representation ratio in 1791,

one can justifiably presume that New Jersey would oppose any
increase in the number of members in the House.

During the

Constitutional Convention, the New Jersey delegation was the
most vocal critic of a large House of Representatives.

Only

after the Great Compromise was the New Jersey delegation's
demands placated.

Thus, it is no surprise that in 1791 New

Jersey's representatives in the government would have
favored limiting the number of representatives in the House.
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Table 9
Distribution and Percentage of Representatives
in East and West Blocs and Fringes

State
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Rhode Island

Number of
Members
2
3
8
5
1
19

New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Delaware

Maryland
Virginia
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

3 (75%)

19

3 (16%)

6
10
5
5
3

65

East
Frinae

West
Bloc

West
Frinae

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

-

—

—

2 (25%)
2 (40%)

11 (58%) 4 (21%)

4
6
8
1

29
Total

East
Bloc
2 (100%)
3 (100%)
4 (50%)
1 (20%)
1 (100%)

1 (25%)
-

-

-

—

—

1 (5%)

1 (16%)
2 (25%)

-

—

—

3 (16%)

-

-

-

-

-

-

1
9
1
2
2

-

-

15 (52%) 8 (28%)

—

—

-

-

14 (22%)

5

(17%)
(90%)
(20%)
(40%)
(67%)

-

3 (50%)
1 (10%)
3 (60%)
-

1 (33%)

18 (28%) 8 (12%)

Therefore, what is the significance of the voting
patterns on the apportionment issue?

Clearly, the South and

New England divided along North-South sectional lines in
opposition on the representation issue in the Second House.
A total of 80 percent of all Southerners voted in a single
bloc and fringe.

Meanwhile, 79 percent of New England's

representatives voted in their own distinct--and opposing-bloc and fringe.

Additionally, no representatives from the

South or New England completely abandoned their section to
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vote with the other section.

John Steele’s votes, while

putting him close to the New England position, were not so
contrary to the Southern position as to reflect a complete
break with his section.
The voting behavior of the Mid-Atlantic states also
points to a North-South sectional division on the
representation issue.

Fifteen (79 percent) of the

Representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states voted solidly
against the Southern position.

Only 16 percent of the

representatives from the Mid-Atlantic states fell within the
Southern bloc.

An additional representative, Tredwell of

New York, was close to belonging to the Southern bloc as a
fringe member.

Even including Tredwell as a potential

Southern sympathizer on the apportionment issue, only 21
percent of the Mid-Atlantic representatives voted with the
Southern bloc as opposed to 79 percent who voted just as
solidly against it.

East-West considerations may have been

in the back of the minds of some the Congressmen, but not
enough to detect by cluster bloc analysis.
The question arises as to the degree of sectionalism
within the North between the Mid-Atlantic states and New
England.

The fact that seven representatives from the Mid-

Atlantic states voted in a single bloc and fringe opposed to
the New England states is significant.

What is even more

significant is that all seven of those representatives were
from New York and Pennsylvania.

The fact that 50 percent of

the representatives from Pennsylvania and New York, the two
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largest and most influential Mid-Atlantic states, voted as a
mini-bloc surely indicates a significant degree of
sectionalism.
Of all the representatives who failed to vote within
their section's bloc or fringe, only Laurance and Tredwell
of New York and Findley and Muhlenberg of Pennsylvania,
totally abandoned the North for the South.

But none of the

four representatives were from the states holding either the
extreme New England or Southern positions.
Thus, an analysis of the roll call data pertaining to
the apportionment debate in the Second Congress proves my
hypothesis.

The South did unite against the North to favor

a large increase in the size of the House of
Representatives.
blocs emerged.

But within the North, two distinct voting
One coalition consisted of the New England

states and New Jersey.

The other bloc was comprised of the

largest Mid-Atlantic states: New York and Pennsylvania.

The

Mid-Atlantic states, while solidly against the Southern
position of any measure to radically increase the size of
the House, failed to reach a consensus with their Northern
colleagues.

As a result, a division between New England the

Mid-Atlantic states emerged.

C H AP T E R 7

CONCLUSION

From 1787 until 1792 American statesmen debated the
representation issue.

The delegates to the Constitutional

Convention in the summer of 1787 struggled with the question
of slavery's role in the apportionment of representatives to
the national legislature.

Coupled with the debate

surrounding the merits of a bicameral legislature, the
representation issue almost brought the Convention to an
end.

But the Convention reached a compromise.

On the basis

of both the three-fifths clause and the Great Compromise,
representation in the House of Representatives would be
apportioned at a ratio of not more than one representative
for each thirty thousand persons.
In the state ratifying conventions the representation
issue was a point of contention between the Anti-Federalist
critics of the Constitution and its Federalist supporters.
The Anti-Federalists claimed that the Constitution's
apportionment provisions fixing the representation ratio at
not more than one representative for each thirty thousand
persons would unnecessarily limit the size of the House of
Representatives.

A House limited in number, they argued,

could not guarantee the peoples' liberties.
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Therefore, the
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number of representatives in the House should be increased.
However, the Federalist supporters of the Constitution
contended that a limited number of representatives in the
House would prevent the emergence of the tyranny of the
legislative majority.

Additionally, they stressed that any

increase in the House would burden the people with
unnecessary costs for maintaining the Congress.
The Federalists won the ratification contest in 1788
when New Hampshire, as the ninth state to do so, ratified
the Constitution.

But the Anti-Federalists took heart in

the proposed constitutional amendments submitted by several
of that state ratifying conventions.

Six of the ratifying

conventions, those in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Virginia, New York, and North Carolina, suggested
a constitutional amendment to change the apportionment
provisions to allow for a more drastic increase in the
number of representatives in the House.
James Madison, one of the Constitution's framers and
earliest supporters, brought the representation issue to the
floor of the First Congress.

Madison understood that a

significant number of Americans remained critical of the
Constitution on the ground that not only did it not contain
a Bill of Rights, but that it limited representation in the
House of Representatives.

He therefore offered the House of

Representatives a list of constitutional amendments
addressing those grievances.
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By September 1789 the House of Representatives and the
Senate had agreed on a final list of twelve proposed
constitutional amendments to be submitted to the states.
The first of those amendments was an apportionment amendment
that would have significantly increased the size of the
House of Representatives.

The second of those amendments

prohibited the Congress from granting itself a mid-term pay
raise.

But when submitted to the states, the first two

amendments failed to pass the required three-fourths of the
states for ratification.
proposed First Amendment.

Only seven states ratified the
When Virginia ratified amendments

III thorough XII, they became the first ten amendments to
the Constitution--the Bill of Rights.
When the Second Congress convened in late 1791, the
representation issue remained unsettled.

The representation

debate surrounded the representation ratio and the size of
future House of Representatives.

In October 1791,

Representative John Laurance proposed a settlement of the
issue of the representation ratio.

He submitted a

resolution to the House calling for a reapportionment of
representatives at a ratio of one representative for every
thirty thousand persons.

Thereafter, from October 1791

until April 1792, the representation ratio was the topic of
near continuous debate in the Congress.
In the House of Representatives the apportionment
debate became a contest between North and South.

The South,

with a larger population, could expect to gain more

107

representatives than the North if there were a new
apportionment at a lower representation ratio.

At the same

time, the New England states came to oppose any measure that
would lead to an increase in the size of the House.
Finally, after three different bills and a presidential
veto, President Washington signed an apportionment bill into
law with a representation ratio of one representatives for
every thirty-three thousand persons.

Representation was

reapportioned on the basis of the apportionment law in time
for the Third Congress.

The number of members in the House

increased from sixty-five to one hundred and five.l

As

expected, the South gained by far the most representatives.
The proposed First Amendment remained unratified by the
states and has subsequently been relegated to the status of
a footnote in history, when mentioned at all.

In contrast,

in 1992, two hundred years after the fact, three-fourths of
the states finally ratified the proposed Second Amendment.
Meanwhile, the Bill of Rights became the basis for the
American peoples' personal liberties and freedoms.
The implications of the apportionment debate were
limited in the early 1790s.

The reapportionment of

representation on the basis of a representation ratio of one
representative for every thirty-three thousand persons
changed little.

No major changes occurred in the power

lUnder the Apportionment Act of 1929, the number of
representatives in the House was fixed at 435. Jay M.
Shafritz, The Dorsey Dictionary of American Government and
Politics (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1988), 29.

108

structure of Washington's administrations.

Decision making

remained firmly settled in the President, his cabinet, and
Congress.

The House was Southern dominated, but not more

demagogic than before.

The period was still centered on the

confrontation between the Hamiltonians and Jeffersonians in
Washington's cabinet, not between the North and the South.
However, the apportionment debate brought an early
sectional conflict to the fore of American politics.

Even

before the rift between the New England Federalists and the
Southern Jeffersonian-Republicans that emerged during the
Quasi-War with France and the Election of 1800, it was clear
that the two sections held significantly different views on
both the government and the American people.

This was true

even if some early tensions on the slavery issue were
ignored.
One can only imagine the chaos that would be the House
of Representatives if the apportionment amendment had
passed.

Supposing a population of two hundred and fifty

million today, after the Census of 1990, the House would be
comprised of over five thousand representatives.

With the

gridlock that paralyses the House today, we can only long
for leaders and statesmen as reasonable and dedicated as
both the Federalists and Anti-Federalists of the early
years.
As with any work, during the research and writing of
this paper certain unanswered guestions emerged that should
be examined by future researchers.

The most basic guestion
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is how consistently did the New England and Southern states
vote as blocs in the House of Representatives during
Washington's administrations?

Did the issue of the militia

bill, relations with the Indians on the western frontier, or
reactions to the French Revolution divide the House along
sectional lines?

Was a North-South sectionalism therefore a

more common feature of national politics in the early 1790s
than has generally been acknowledged?
Another important question that requires attention
centers on the lack of private debate surrounding the
apportionment issue after the failure of the apportionment
amendment.

Although the representation issue was heartily

debated in both the Constitutional Convention and the state
ratifying conventions, why did that debate fail to capture
the public's imagination during the debates in the First and
Second Congress.

After 1789 the apportionment debate was

centered primarily in the House of Representatives.

Almost

nothing was written of the proposed first amendment or the
apportionment bills that were debated in the Congress.
Could it be that the general population perceived the
representation issue as one that affected them less than
more pressing issues of taxation, banking, possible war, and
Indian relations?
The role of the New England states in the rest of the
Federalist Era brings to the surface the most intriguing
question surrounding the apportionment debate, one that may
well be unanswerable.

Almost as a unit the representatives
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from New England voted in true Hamiltonian fashion to oppose
an increase in the size of the House.

Was the apportionment

issue the beginning of the solid alignment of New England
against the eventual Federalist Party?

Can the New England

voting bloc on the apportionment debate from 1790 through
1792 be viewed as the beginning of the core New England
support of the Federalist Party?
A final question remained of interest to me as I wrote
this paper.

Trying to place the representation debate in

the context of the entire Federalist Era, I wondered what
impact that New England's intransigeance on an issue in.the
House of Representatives had on the eventual success of the
Jeffersonian-Republicans.

Certainly the Revolution of 1800

was a result of the failures of Adams's administration and
was not a direct result of New England's opposition to an
increase in the size of the House.

But is it not possible

that the representation debate showed New England, and by
implication, the Federalists' true sentiments about the
masses?

Did many future Jeffersonian-Republican realize for

the first time that they possessed a distinctly different
outlook on politics than the Federalists?

Future party

allegiance is therefore a question that future researchers
ought to examine.

In short, was the representation debate

from 1787 through 1792 an isolated instance of sectionalism,
or merely one of the first steps in a long and drawn out
sectional conflict between the North and the South?

APPENDIX

1

LIST OF ROLL CALLS
Roll Call 1:
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 2 :
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:

15 November 1791
To pass the resolution submitted byJohn Laurance of New York
establishing a representation ratio
of one representative for each
thirty thousand persons.
The resolution would set the
representation ratio at one
representative for each thirty
thousand persons.
Yea 25, nay 23. The resolution
passes.
Until the next enumeration, the
representation ratio will be set at
one representative for each thirty
thousand persons.
Annals of Congress, p. 191; House
Journal, pp. 30-31.
H021001
Card 1, column 33
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who favored a large
representation in the House.
23 November 1791
To amend H.R. 147, a bill to
apportion representation according
to the first enumeration, so that
the representation ratio is one to
thirty-four thousand.
The amendment would establish a
representation ratio of one to
thirty-four thousand.
Yea 21, nay 38. The amendment
fails.
H.R. 147 continues to have a
representation ratio of one to
thirty thousand.
Annals of Congress, p. 208; House
Journal, pp. 37-38.
H021002
Card 1, column 34
111

112

Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 3:
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 4 :
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 5 :
Date:
Measure:

A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressman who hoped to see a
larger increase in the size of the
House.
24 November 1791
To pass H.R. 147.
The bill would establish a
representation ratio of one to
thirty thousand as law.
Yea 43, nay 12
An apportionment bill with a
representation ratio of one to
thirty thousand passes the House.
Annals of Congress, p. 210; House
Journal, p. 40.
H021003
Card 1, column 35
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who favored a large
increase in the size of the House.
14 December 1791
To agree to an amendment to H.R.
146 submitted by John Vining of
Delaware that would set the number
of representatives in the House at
a fixed number instead of at a
ratio of one to thirty-three
thousand.
Vining's amendment would limit the
number of representatives in the
House.
Yea 27, nay 37. The amendment
fails.
H.R. 147 continues to keep a
representation ratio of one to
thirty-three thousand.
Annals of Congress, p. 250; House
Journal, pp. 54-55
H021004
Card 1, column 36
A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting
the size of the House.
14 December 1791
A vote to agree with the Senate
amendment to H.R. 147 that would
have set the representation ratio
at one to thirty-three thousand.
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Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 6:
Date:
Measure:
Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 7 :
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:

The apportionment bill would
contain a representation ratio of
one to thirty-three thousand and
therefore limit the increase in
the number of members in the House.
Yea 29, nay 31. The amendment
fails.
The Senate and the House must
compromise on a representation
ratio.
Annals of Congress, p. 251; House
Journal, pp. 55-56.
H021004
Card 1, column 37
A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressmen who opposed limiting
the increase in the size of the
House of Representatives.
19 December 1791
To recede from the disagreement to
the representation ratio of one to
thirty-three thousand.
If this motioned passed, H.R. 147
would have provided a
representation ratio of one to
thirty-three thousand.
Yea 27, nay 33. The motion fails.
The House fails to accept the
Senate version of the apportionment
bill.
Annals of Congress, p. 251; House
Journal, pp. 58-59.
H021006
Card 1, column 38
A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting
the increase in the House.
19 December 1791
To adhere to the House's earlier
disagreement to the Senate's
representation ratio of one to
thirty-three thousand.
The apportionment bill would have
contained a representation ratio of
one to thirty-three thousand if the
motion failed.
Yea 32, nay 27
The House and the Senate are unable
to agree on a representation ratio.
Annals of Congress, p. 274; House
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ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 8 :
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 9 :
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Journal, pp. 59-60.
H021007
Card 1, column 39
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting
the size of the House.
24 January 1792
To agree to an amendment submitted
by Jonathan Dayton of New Jersey
that would remove the section of
the apportionment resolution
calling for a second enumeration.
The resolution would keep the
population figures used in
apportionment calculations static.
Yea 22, nay 36. The amendment
fails.
The new apportionment bill would
contain mention of a second
enumeration.
Annals of Congress, p. 336; House
Journal, pp. 83-84.
H021012
Card 1, column 44
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting
the increase in the number of
representatives in the House.
24 January 1792
An amendment to the resolution to
prepare a new apportionment bill,
submitted by Samuel Livermore of
New Hampshire, removing the phrase
"no greater ratio be reported than
thirty thousand to one."
The amendment would allow
representation ratios greater than
one to thirty thousand to be
reported in the apportionment bill.
Yea 33, nay 26. The amendment
passes.
In the new apportionment bill a
representation ratio greater than
one to thirty thousand can be
reported.
Annals of Congress, p. 336; House
Journal, pp. 84-85.
H021013
Card 1, column 45
A yea vote would be cast by a

115

Congressman who favored limiting
the increase in the size of the
House of Representatives.
Roll Call 10:
Date:
Measure:
Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 11:
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 12:

20 February 1792
To amend H.R. 163 to strike out the
portion of the resolution calling
for a second enumeration.
The amendment would remove all
mention of a second enumeration in
the apportionment bill and
therefore keep the population
figures used for apportionment
static.
Yea 23, nay 26. The amendment
fails.
The apportionment bill will make
provisions for a second enumeration
on which to base apportionment.
Annals of Congress, p. 415; House
Journal, pp. 104-05.
H021019
Card 1, column 51
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who favored limiting
the increase in the size of the
House.
20 February 1792
An amendment to H.R. 163 submitted
by Joshua Seney of Maryland to
strike the section of the bill
calling for a second enumeration.
If passed, the amendment would have
removed the section of the
apportionment bill calling for a
second enumeration.
Yea 25, nay 26. The amendment
fails.
The apportionment bill will contain
provisions for a second
enumeration.
Annals of Congress, P. 416; House
Journal, pp. 105-06.
H021020
Card 1, column 52
A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting
the size of the increase in the
House.
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Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 13:
Date:
Measure:
Issue:

Vote:
Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 14:
Date:
Measure:

Issue:
Vote:

20 February 1792
An amendment to H.R. 163 that sets
the representation ratio at one to
thirty thousand.
The new apportionment bill would
contain a representation ratio of
one to thirty thousand.
Yea 29, nay 22. The amendment
passes.
H.R. 163 will contain a
representation ratio of one to
thirty thousand.
Annals of Congress, p. 416; House
Journal, pp. 106-07.
H021021
Card 1, column 53
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who favored a larger
increase in the size of the House
of Representatives.
21 February 1792
To pass H.R. 163
The apportionment law would
apportion representation in time
for the next Congress at a ratio of
one representative for each thirty
thousand persons.
Yea 34, nay 16. The bill passes.
Pending the Senate's approval,
representation will be
apportioned at a ratio of one to
thirty thousand in the Third
Congress.
Annals of Congress, p. 418; House
Journal, pp. 107-08.
H021023
Card 1, column 55
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who favored a large
increase in the House.
17 March 1792
To pass an amendment to H.R. 179
that would set the number of
Congressmen in the House at one
hundred and twenty.
Representation in the House would
not be based on any representation
ratio.
Yea 30, nay 31. The amendment
fails.
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Result:

Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 15:
Date:
Measure:

Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 16:
Date:
Measure:
Issue:
Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:

The number of representatives in
the House will be apportioned
according to a representation
ratio.
Annals of Congress, p. 482; House
Journal, pp. 137-38.
H021034
Card 1, column 65
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who favored limiting
the number of representatives in
the House or who beleived that one
hundred and twenty representatives
was an equitable compromise.
23 March 1792
A motion submitted by Samuel
Livermore of New Hampshire to
recede from all disagreements to
the Senate's amendments to H.R.
179.
The Senate's amendment dictates
that the reapportionment in the
House be made before the Fifth
Congress and fixes the number of
representatives.
Yea 31, nay 29
H.R. 179, as amended by the Senate,
passes the Congress.
Annals of Congress, p. 482; House
Journal, pp. 146-47.
H021034
Card 1, column 67
A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting
the size of the House.
6 April 1792
To override President Washington's
veto of H.R. 179.
To pass the apportionment bill as
amended by the Senate.
Yea 28, nay 33. The House is
unable to override the President's
veto.
New amendments must be submitted to
H.R. 179 to comply with the
President's veto message.
Annals of Congress, p. 541; House
Journal, pp. 170-71.
H021046
Card 1, column 46
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Attitudinal position:

Roll Call 17:
Date:
Measure:
Issue:

Vote:
Result:
Location:
ICPSR variable number:
ICPSR location:
Attitudinal position:

A nay vote would be cast by a
Congressman who opposed limiting
the increase in the size of the
House.
9 April 1792.
To amend H.R. 179 to apportion
representation at a ratio of one to
thirty-three thousand.
After 3 March 1793 the House will
consist of members apportioned at a
ratio of one to thirty-three
thousand.
Yea 34, nay 30.
Another apportionment bill passes
the House.
Annals of Congress, p. 548; House
Journal, pp. 175-76.
H021047
Card 1, column 80
A yea vote would be cast by a
Congressman who favored limiting
the increase in the size of the
House.

APPENDIX 2

ATTITUDINAL POSITION OF EACH BLOC ON
REPRESENTATION ROLL CALLS1
Roll
Call
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Southern
Vote
yea
nay
yea
nay
nay
nay
yea
nay
nay
nay
nay
yea
yea
nay
nay
nay
nay

New England
Vote
nay
yea
nay
yea
yea
yea
nay
yea
yea
yea
yea
nay
nay
yea
yea
yea
yea

Mid-Atlantic
Vote
yea
nay
yea
yea
yea
yea
nay
nay
yea
abstain
abstain
abstain
nay
yea
yea
yea
yea

llnter-University Consortium for Political and Social
Research, United States Congressional Roll Call Voting
Records, 2 House, 1791-1793, machine readable records,
ICPSR, 0004.
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APPENDIX 3

REPRESENTATIVES IN THE NEW ENGLAND BLOC AND FRINGE
New England Bloc
Fisher Ames (Massachusetts)
Elias Boudinot (New Jersey)
Benjamin Bourn (Massachusetts)
Sherjashub Bourne (Rhode Island)
Abraham Clark (New Jersey)
Nicholas Gilman (New Hampshire)
Benjamin Goodhue (Massachusetts)
Aaron Kitchell (New Jersey)
Amasa Learned (Connecticut)
Samule Livermore (New Hampshire)
Nathaniel Niles (Vermont)
Isreal Smith (Vermont)
Jermiah Smith (New Hampshire)
George Thacher (Massachusetts)
New England Fringe
Jonathan Dayton (New Jersey)
Theodore Sedgwick (Massachusetts)
Jonathan Sturges (Connecticut)
Artemus Ward (Massachusetts)
Jeremiah Wadsworth (Connecticut)
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC BLOC AND FRINGE
Mid-Atlantic Bloc
Egbert Benson (New York)
Thomas Fitzsimons (Pennsylvania)
Thomas Hartley (Pennsylvania)
Isreal Jacobs (Pennsylvania)
John W. Kittera (Pennsylvania)
Amasa Learned (Connecticut)
Peter Silvester (New York)
Jeremiah Wadsworth (Connecticut)
Mid-Atlantic Bloc
Abraham Clark (New Jersey)
James Gordon (New York)
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APPENDIX 3 (con’t)
REPRESENTATIVES IN THE SOUTHERN BLOC AND FRINGE
Southern Bloc
Abraham Baldwin (Georgia)
John Brown (Virginia)
William Findley (Pennsylvania)
William B. Giles (Virginia)
Samuel Griffin (Virginia)
Daniel Huger (South Carolina)
Richard Bland Lee (Virginia)
Nathaniel Macon (North Carolina)
James Madison (Virginia)
Andrew Moore (Virginia)
Frederick A.C. Muhlenberg (Pennsylvania)
John Page (Virginia)
Joshua Seney (Maryland)
Thomas Sumter (South Carolina)
Abraham Venable (Virginia)
Alexander White (Virginia)
Francis Willis (Georgia)
Southern Fringe
John Ashe (North Carolina)
William Barry Grove (North Carolina)
Philip Key (Maryland)
John Laurance (New York)
William Vans Murray (Maryland)
Anthony Wayne (Georgia)
Joshiah Parker (Virginia)
Samuel Sterett (Maryland)
Thomas Tudor Tucker (South Carolina)
Hugh Williamson (North Carolina)
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DISTRIBUTION OF REPRESENTATIVES IN NEW ENGLAND
MID-ATLANTIC, AND SOUTHERN BLOCS AND FRINGES

NEW ENGLAND
MID-ATLANTIC
BLOC
FRINGE BLOC
FRINGE
2(100%)
3(100%)
4 (50%) 2 (25%)
1 (20%) 2 (40%) 2 (20%)
1(100%)
-

New Jersey
New York
Pennsylvania
Delaware

3 (75%) 1 (25%)

4
6
8
1

Maryland
6
Virginia
10
North Carolina 5
South Carolina 5
Georgia
3
Total

67

BLOC

SOUTHERN
FRINGE

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

-

-

-

-

-

1 (25%)
2 (33%) 1 (17%)
4 (40%)
2 (25%)
—

-

-

-

-

-

-

—

—

—

—

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

14 (21%) 5 (7%)

—

—

-

-

-

8 (12%) 2 (3%)

1 (17%)

-

1
9
1
2
2

(17%)
(90%)
(20%)
(40%)
(67%)

-

3
1
3
1
1

(50%)
(10%)
(60%)
(20%)
(33%)

17 (25%) 10 (15%

APPENDIX

TOTAL
STATE
]
MEMBERS
Vermont
2
New Hampshire
3
Massachusetts
8
Connecticut
5
Rhode Island
1

APPENDIX

6

POPULATION (
DF THE UNITED STATES AT THE FIRST CENSUS1
State
Vermont
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Rhode Island
Connecticut

Free Persons
85,523
141,727
475,327
67,877
235.182
1,005,636

New York
New Jersey
Pennsylvania
Delaware

318,796
172,716
430,636
50.209
972,357

12,794
6,854
2,242
5.332
27,422

331,590
179,570
432,878
55.541
999,579

Maryland
Virginia
Kentucky
North Carolina
South Carolina
Georgia

216,692
454,983
61,247
293,179
141,979
53.284
1,221,364

61,822
175,576
7,458
60,343
64,256
17.558
387,013

278,514
630,559
68,705
353,522
206,235
70.842
1,608,377

Total

3 .199.357

416.767

3.615.924

3/5 of Slaves
10
95
0
569
1.658
2,332

Total
85,533
141,822
475,327
68,446
236.840
1,007,968

^Heads Of Families At The First Census Of The United
States Taken In The Year 1790: Vermont (Baltimore:
Genealogical Publishing Company, 1966), 4.
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